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REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION: THE SOCIAL NETWORK
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch† & Margaret S. Williams††

As class certification wanes, plaintiffs’ lawyers resolve
hundreds of thousands of individual lawsuits through aggregate settlements in multidistrict litigation. But without class
actions, formal rules are scarce and judges rarely scrutinize
the private agreements that result. Meanwhile, the same principal-agent concerns that plagued class-action attorneys linger. These circumstances are ripe for exploitation: few rules,
little oversight, multi-million dollar common-benefit fees, and a
push for settlement can tempt a cadre of repeat players to fill
in the gaps in ways that further their own self-interest.
Although multidistrict litigation now comprises 36% of the
pending federal civil caseload, legal scholars have offered little sustained theoretical or empirical analysis as to how repeat players’ enforcement efforts shape litigation or claims
resolution. We wade into this increasingly controversial territory to offer the first comprehensive empirical investigation of
private attorneys’ efforts in multidistrict leadership on both the
plaintiff and defense side. We found that transferee judges
regularly appoint the same lead attorneys.
To then uncover what the naked eye cannot see, we employed a social-network analysis to reveal repeat actors’ connections to one another. No matter what measure of centrality
we used, a key group of attorneys maintained their elite position within the network. This matters considerably, for lead
lawyers control the proceeding and negotiate settlements.
They can bargain for what may matter to them most: defendants want to end lawsuits, and plaintiffs’ lawyers want to
† Charles H. Kirbo Chair of Law, University of Georgia Law School. Our
thanks to Christina Boyd, Brannon Denning, Emery Lee, Kay Levine, Jonathan
Nash, Adam Zimmerman, anonymous transferee judges, and anonymous multidistrict litigation attorneys, as well as participants at Duke Law School’s MassTort MDL Program for Judicial Conference Committees, and Emory/UGA’s faculty
workshop for their comments on earlier drafts and insights on the topic. Thanks
also to Payton Bradford, Hayes Dever, and Kyle Hollomon for their research and
data collection assistance, and especially to Georgia School of Law for generously
funding this research. With one exception in 2009, Professor Burch has never
provided outside consulting or expert witness services. No outside funding or
grants have been used to fund our work.
†† Visiting Assistant Professor at Vanderbilt Law School.
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recover for their clients and receive high fee awards along the
way.
By identifying settlement provisions that one might argue
principally benefit the repeat players, we examined the publicly available nonclass settlements these elite lawyers designed. Over a twenty-two-year span, we were unable to find
any deal that did not feature at least one closure provision for
defendants, and likewise found that nearly all settlements
contained some provision that increased lead plaintiffs’ lawyers’ common-benefit fees. Bargaining for attorneys’ fees with
one’s opponent is a stark departure from traditional contingent-fee principles, which are designed to tie lawyers’ fees to
their clients’ outcome. Based on the evidence available to us,
we found reason to be concerned that when repeat players
influence the practices and norms that govern multidistrict
proceedings—when they “play for rules,” so to speak—the
rules they develop may principally benefit them at the expense
of one-shot plaintiffs.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE RISE OF REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Growth of Multidistrict Litigation and the
Lack of Formal Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Why Repeat Players are so Likely in
Multidistrict Litigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Lead Lawyer Selection Methods . . . . . . . . . . .
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3. Settlement Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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B. Settlement Provisions and Lead Lawyers’
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INTRODUCTION
Time and again judges appoint the same plaintiffs’ attorneys to lead large multidistrict litigations, then compensate
them handsomely for doing so. But identifying repetitive play
is merely the tip of the iceberg, for what lies beneath repeat
plaintiff and defense attorneys’ formal interactions has critical
implications for the development of law and the fulfillment of
fundamental procedural and tort goals such as fairness, efficiency, compensation, and deterrence. When repeat players
interact over time, their past and present connections can impact norm development and entrenchment. Social architecture
may thus affect how actors perceive ethically grey areas in
structuring aggregate settlements, whether they privilege selfinterest over clients’ interests, and how they approach regulatory ambiguities.
Because hard-and-fast formal rules are scarce when multidistrict litigation is not certified as a class action, transferee
judges tend to seek guidance from predecessors, peers, and
lawyers who have litigated other multidistrict proceedings.1
Even though multidistricting aims to avoid duplicative pretrial
efforts, most cases settle.2 So, the small cadre of repeat players
1
For example, the Zyprexa litigation heavily influenced both the Guidant
and the Vioxx litigation. E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 650 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 560 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2009); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1657, 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2008); In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05–1708, 2008 WL 682174, at
*17–18 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).
2
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (limiting multidistrict proceedings to pretrial
litigation only); Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.
26, 40 (1998). The Panel has remanded only 2.9% of cases to their original
districts. Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 462,501 civil actions for pretrial proceedings. By the end of 2013, a total of 13,432 actions had
been remanded for trial, 398 had been reassigned within the transferee districts,
359,432 had been terminated in the transferee courts, and 89,123 were pending
throughout the district courts. UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION–JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statis-
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and the procedural norms they develop are integral to resolving
the cases.
The prevalence of norms over formal, legal precedent affords repeat players a critical opportunity. As they act strategically to maximize gains over a series of cases, and play for
“rules,” the shorthand term for standardized practices that will
tip the scales in their favor in future cases, those rules may well
stick. When layered atop “bet-the-company” litigation, multimillion-dollar attorneys’ fees, and significant media attention,
the full picture for potential abuse and influence begins to
emerge. Multidistrict cases like those against Volkswagen over
its emission-defeat device3 and General Motors over its ignition-switch defect4 have increased in both prominence and
quantity; they have risen from 16% of the federal courts’ civil
caseload in 2002 to 36% in 2014.5 Excluding social security
and prisoner cases escalates that number to 45.6%.6 Consequently, through publicity, replication, and proportion, key
players’ influence and rules can impact the entire civil justice
system.7
High stakes, rising filings, private settlements, and significant attorneys’ fees—sometimes more than $350 million8 in
common-benefit fees alone—have spurred heated debate. Multidistrict litigation’s champions herald its quiet efficiency and
ability to benefit claimants and attorneys through uniform decisions and resolutions.9 But critics suggest that it can lead to
“lawless administration of aggregate claims” and “black
holes.”10
tics-reports/criminal-justice-act-judicial-business-2013 [https://perma.cc/
XH8G-ZRDR].
3
In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., No. 15-md-2672 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
4
In re GM LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-md-02543 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
5
MDL Standards and Best Practices x, DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUD. STUD. (2014).
6
Id. at x–xi.
7
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
8
See Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA.
L. REV. 371, 385 (2014).
9
E.g., id. at 380; John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the
Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2233 (2008).
10
E.g., In re United States Lines, Inc., 1998 WL 382023, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(explaining appellants’ description of the asbestos multidistrict litigation as “a
black hole” and “the third level of Dante’s inferno”); John G. Heyburn II & Francis
E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIG. 27, 31 (2012)
(“The single most prominent complaint about multidistrict litigation arises from
counsel’s negative experiences in so-called black hole cases—those that seem not
to move at an acceptable pace.”); Linda Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the
Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. L. REV. 511, 552 (2013) (noting
that the use of “quasi-class action,” a term used in some multidistrict proceed-
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The lead attorneys who run these litigations must act as
fiduciaries to all plaintiffs, yet critics claim that those lawyers
have engaged in self-enriching acts: by offering lead lawyers’
“ ‘red-carpet treatment on fees’ in return for favorable terms
elsewhere,” defendants can take advantage of lead attorneys’
control over settlement negotiations to strike deals that benefit
the leaders and the defendant, but not the claimants.11 Moreover, because transferee judges handpick lead attorneys and
control their financial remuneration through fee transfers from
non-lead attorneys, critics contend that “obedience is the prudent course for non-lead lawyers . . . .”12 Critics likewise note
that, as “veterans,” leaders “have developed an arsenal of strategies to corral, convince, and coerce other lawyers to come
together for purposes of organizing and settling cases en
masse.”13 Yet, repeat players explain that it is only through
their extensive experience and financial means that they can
“go toe to toe” with big defense firms.14
Despite this burgeoning battle over multidistrict proceedings and the ramifications of repeat play, relatively little empirical research exists. This Article begins to fill that gap not just
by collecting data or investigating the centrality of repeat plaintiff and defense attorneys, but also by analyzing the results
they obtain on behalf of themselves and their clients. Part I
launches this inquiry with a look into the circumstances behind multidistrict litigation’s ascent and its absence of formal
rules. When formal rules are scarce, socially constructed rules
and norms impact legal outcomes on a broad scale. Accordingly, this Part theorizes the ways in which current practices,
including judicial methods for selecting lead lawyers, create
fertile conditions for repeat play and norm development. It
likewise evaluates the costs and benefits of appointing repeat
players, and thus rounds out the usual efficiency maxim that
typically justifies centralizing cases.15
ings, “is a convenient, lazy fabrication to justify the lawless administration of
aggregate claims.”).
11
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 133
(2010).
12
Id. at 110.
13
Myriam Gilles, Tribal Rituals of the MDL, 5 J. TORT L. 173, 174 (2012).
14
Amanda Bronstad, ‘Good Ol’ Boys Club’ in MDL, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 28, 2015;
see also Perry Cooper, MDLs Led by Usual Suspects, and Not Everyone is Happy,
BNA CLASS ACTION LITIG. RPT., June 24, 2016.
15
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (noting that transfer must “promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions”).
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By focusing on the institutional players who routinely—
and somewhat administratively—negotiate and settle similar
claims, this Article then adds three missing ingredients to the
empirical and theoretical literature on aggregate litigation.
First, Part II introduces an affiliation network analysis (a scientific approach to understanding how agents in a complex system interact)16 to visualize the connections among plaintiffs’
attorneys and between lead plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys.
To do this, we built an original dataset out of all the judicially
selected lead lawyers in all product liability and sales practice
proceedings pending on the multidistrict litigation docket as of
May 2013—seventy-three total proceedings. The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the Panel) centralized those
proceedings over a twenty-two-year span and collectively they
include over 312,500 actions.
Using that data for the social-network analysis, Part II captures the interplay between lead plaintiff and defense attorneys. When many agents interact—judges, multiple attorneys,
and defendants, for instance—game theory’s traditional analytic focus on bilateral interactions can break down.17 Network
analysis, however, provides us with a tool for mapping the complex connections between many people (lead attorneys) and
events (multidistrict proceedings), allows us to identify critical
actors and proceedings, and helps us to theorize more accurately about how multidistricting promotes efficiency and resolves cases.18 With the network intact, we can then
hypothesize about what flows through it and what repeat players’ connectedness might mean to the outcomes they generate.
Central actors might, for example, wield their power to create

16
Daniel M. Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network
Analysis of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 467 (2010).
17
As John Miller and Scott Page point out:
When an agent interacts with only a few other agents, we can usually trace all of the potential actions and reactions. When an agent
faces an infinity of other agents, we can average out . . . the behavior
of the masses and again find ourselves back in a world that can
easily be traced. It is in between these two extremes—when an
agent interacts with a moderate number of others—that our traditional analytic tools break down.
JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 221 (2007).
18
See generally NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED: THE
SURPRISING POWER OF OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HOW THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES 9–10
(2009) (describing network attributes).
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and develop rules, influence settlement design, and shape ethical norms.19
Accordingly, Part III introduces the second ingredient
missing from current scholarship: an empirical analysis of both
the settlements repeat players design and the common-benefit
fee practices used to compensate lead plaintiffs’ lawyers. While
the presence of tightly networked multidistrict-litigation attorneys is hardly surprising given our past findings,20 the influence these key players have on settlements has been largely
ignored. Looking at the attorneys within the network, we confirmed that one of the top five most connected repeat players
participated directly in each settled proceeding’s leadership.
We then analyzed the publicly available nonclass settlements
that resulted within our dataset for provisions that may be
more beneficial to counsel than to litigants. This brought to
light the practices and norms that influential actors used to
foster settlement and influence attorneys’ fees outside of certified class actions.
All of the examined settlements featured at least one provision that encouraged closure and finality (which benefits the
defendant), and nearly all settlements contained some provision that increased lead plaintiffs’ lawyers’ common-benefit
fees. When plaintiffs’ lawyers negotiate their fees with the defendant, it raises questions about self-dealing for it severs the
traditional contingent-fee tie between attorneys and their clients and may compromise attorneys’ loyalties.21 We thus
found reason to be concerned that the rules and norms that
repeat players collectively design may benefit them at the expense of one-shot plaintiffs.
To be sure, there is no viable means to demonstrate
whether repeat play generates “better” or “worse” client outcomes, for few alternative settlement values are publicly available for comparison. And clauses that one might label as selfdealing or primarily benefitting counsel arise in the class context, too.22 But multidistrict litigation lacks Rule 23’s struc19

See CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS: THEORIES, CONFINDINGS 202 (2013) (“[Social networks] are influenced by and responsive to social norms and institutions. Through repeated interactions, new norms
and institutions are created.”).
20
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71, 95–101 (2015); Margaret S. Williams, Emery G. Lee III & Catherine R.
Borden, Repeat Players in Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141, 149–60
(Apr. 2014, backdated to 2012).
21
Silver & Miller, supra note 11, at 134.
22
Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class
Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 904 (2017).
CEPTS, AND

R
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tural assurances of fairness—judicial settlement approval,
objectors, and appeals. Setting aside bad faith and overt collusion, the fact that the same players appear in the vast majority
of these proceedings and design remarkably similar settlements that benefit themselves raises new questions about adequate representation and the need for strong case management
in multidistrict litigation.
Consequently, Part IV adds the third missing ingredient to
the theoretical literature on aggregate litigation by exploring
the impact well-connected repeat actors may have on case resolutions, ethical norms, and law reform. Take ethics, for example: the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were founded on
an individual attorney-client relationship, and although rules
like 1.8(g) (the aggregate settlement rule) have evolved to address some concerns in mass representation, doctrinal confusion over the rule’s application has opened it up to
manipulation and social construction by the very parties it
seeks to regulate.23 If the lines between ethical and unethical
behavior blur and pushing boundaries benefits central players
who possess the power and means to sanction others, that
behavior may turn into the accepted norm.24 Accordingly, Part
IV concludes by considering what effect a cohesive network of
repeat actors may have on law reform efforts. Given agents’
historical adaptability, regulatory designers may find more
success with flexible measures that harness competitive forces
already in play than top-down, external reforms.

23
E.g., Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The
Evolving Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 298–304 (2015).
24
Francesca Gina et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior,
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 393–94, 398 (2009); see also Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher,
Social Norms and Human Cooperation, 4 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 185, 186–87
(2004) (discussing the relationship between social norms and punishment). Professor Charles Kadushin explains transmission through networks as follows:
[S]omething may be transmitted or diffused through (1) contact that
involves some form of influence, persuasion, or coercion—for example, someone teaches me something or influences me to do something, to think a certain way, or provide me with a new tool; (2)
contact that involves some kind of emulation—for example, my
friend has an idea or tool that I think it would be useful to have; or
(3) adoption or emulation without direct social contact—for example, I hear or read about something that I like.
KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 135.

R
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I
THE RISE OF REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION
Most people experience only the periphery of the legal system: requesting marriage licenses, paying traffic violations, executing and probating wills, and sometimes getting divorced.
But, because of their profession or their size, certain people
and corporations encounter the judicial system regularly—
think Walmart or attorneys, for example. Of course, there is a
wide margin between these two ends of the spectrum, and
many people will have casual repeat encounters, falling somewhere in between “one-shotters” and more extensive “repeat
players” as we use the term.25
Spurred by Marc Galanter’s iconic work in the field, academics have long expected that routine repeat players who encounter the legal system time and again will have different
goals than one-shotters. Regulars develop expertise, have a
stable of go-to specialists, cultivate relationships with institutional incumbents like judges and their staff, and enjoy economies of scale with low start-up costs for any given case.26
Because they encounter the system and its inhabitants frequently, their reputation becomes important27: attorneys
might develop reputations as masterful trial lawyers or settlement artists, and corporations might decide to vigorously defend even meritorious cases to signal that they are not easy
targets. Finally, repeat players tend to litigate with more in
mind than just the stakes of a particular lawsuit. They may act
strategically to maximize gains over a series of cases, and play
for “rules,” the short-hand term for standard practices and
norms that will tip the scales in their favor in future cases.28
Much of the literature surrounding repeat players contemplates litigants as the repeat players—Walmart, Merck, or
Johnson & Johnson.29 And it is true that major corporate
defendants are repeat actors in multidistrict litigation. But
they are not the only ones. Many plaintiffs’ and defense attor25
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 13,
14 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey, eds. 2003).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
E.g., Galanter, supra note 25, at 19, 22; see Ryan C. Black & Christina L.
Boyd, U.S. Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status, 28 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 286, 287–88 (2012).

R
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neys are repeat players, too.30 This leaves only one group as
probable one-shotters: the plaintiffs themselves, and perhaps
their individually retained attorney who must cede control to
the judicially appointed lead lawyers—but typically not the lead
lawyers themselves. To avoid having to coordinate with hundreds of attorneys, the judge appoints a small cadre of lawyers
to run the lawsuit and make decisions on the group’s behalf.
Although plaintiffs’ lead lawyers owe fiduciary obligations of
loyalty to the plaintiffs, their judicial appointment insulates
them from being fired or hired through conventional means.31
Corporate defendants, with a large cadre of sophisticated
in-house attorneys, can easily and effectively monitor outside
counsel. But multidistrict-litigation plaintiffs may be doubly
disadvantaged: they are not only one-shotters, they also tend to
be less knowledgeable about the law, which is, after all, why
they hired an attorney.32 Yet, repeat plaintiffs’ lawyers’ financial interests might be intertwined with one another through
formal joint-venture agreements that spell out funding coalitions, informal promises to distribute common-benefit work
and leadership positions to allies, and settlement provisions
that condition the deal on achieving a certain client participation rate. While lawyers compete with one another for leadership positions and clients, they may also play the long game to
maximize their mutual financial gains.33 So, the concern is

30
Studies have shown, for example, that repeat players have been more
successful in qui tam litigation, that attorneys who regularly appear before the
same appellate court have higher win rates than their opponents, and that judges
are more likely to vote against lawyers who lack experience before their court.
David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from
Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1258 (2012); Susan Brodie Haire et
al., Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decision Making in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 678, 681 (1999).
31
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 1.04 reporter’s notes cmt.
a, 1.05 illustrations 2, 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); Charles Silver, The Responsibilities
of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985,
1987–89 (2011).
32
See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30
(1988); Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries,
85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1639 (1999); Russell Korobkin & Chris Gutherie, Psychology,
Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV.
77, 82 (1997).
33
E.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 41, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust
Litig., No. 13-md-2420 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Lithium Ion Batteries
Transcript] (“Guido and I collectively have probably over a hundred years of experience . . . I’ve known Mr. Cotchett for decades, as well as the group from Lieff
Cabraser. I’ve worked with them in virtually every case, so has everybody.”).
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that repeat plaintiffs’ lawyers may be more loyal to each other
or even to defense attorneys than to their own clients.34
These issues do not occur in a vacuum; they take place
against a rich backdrop of legal developments and socially and
judicially constructed norms. Accordingly, this Part explores
the legal context and leadership selection methodology, which
sets the table for understanding how a small group of repeat
players came to exert such a profound influence in aggregate
litigation. It then considers those players’ competitive advantages and the ways in which those advantages might serve or
disserve plaintiffs.
A. The Growth of Multidistrict Litigation and the Lack of
Formal Rules
Repeat players’ influence derives in part from the steady
use of multidistrict litigation to resolve mass harms as classcertification standards become more stringent. Corporations
operate on an increasingly nationwide and worldwide scale, yet
certifying a nationwide class action where state laws govern
has become less likely due to a series of congressional and
judicial decisions. Congress and the appellate courts have
made certification more onerous by strengthening the commonality requirement,35 requiring plaintiffs to prove Rule 23’s
prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence,36 instructing
judges to delve into a case’s merits when the merits overlap

34
Galanter, supra note 25, at 24 (“The source of business generally counts
for more than the client, especially where the client is unlikely to return or to send
in other clients. The client is then expendable: he can be exploited to the full.”).
As plaintiff’s attorney Francis Scarpulla noted in supporting the “consensus”
group in the Lithium Ion Batteries litigation, “this group works collegially and
cooperatively with every single person sitting at that defense table. I’ve known
some of them for 45 years, as long as I [sic] been practicing. And I’ve probably
been lead counsel in more cases than anybody in this courtroom . . . .” Lithium Ion
Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 40. When the judge then asked the defendants’ counsel about objections to the proposed plaintiffs’ structure, Jim McGinnis
responded, “I [sic] been practicing here for almost 34 years, have known all of the
people on that side of the courtroom for most of those years, and I can tell you
with the utmost confidence that I’ve never had a problem with any one of them.”
Id. at 44.
35
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes strengthened the commonality standard
under Rule 23(a) and ensured that defendants could raise individual defenses,
which could inhibit Rule 23(b)(3) certification. 564 U.S. 338, 363–67 (2011).
36
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414
(2014); Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95
(2013) (internal citations excluded).
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with class-certification requirements,37 and complicating
choice-of-law and manageability questions through federal jurisdiction.38 Thus, it is unsurprising that past researchers
found an increasing number of personal-injury and productliability cases consolidated through multidistrict litigation, and
a decreasing number of class-certification motions.39
Stricter certification requirements present challenges for
the transferee judges who coordinate and manage multidistrict
cases. While judges were often critiqued for their class-certification opinions,40 Rule 23 set forth clear judicial authority to
appoint class counsel, ensure adequate representation, approve settlements, and award attorneys’ fees. Plus, Rule 23(f)
built in appellate jurisdiction, providing a clear path to error
correction via interlocutory appeal. Time and again, appellate
court judges overturned collusive deals that benefited the attorneys, but disserved class members.41
While plenary class certification has waned, claims of corporate wrongdoing have not. When those affected by corporate
misconduct want to sue, plaintiffs’ lawyers aggregate them
through advertising and referrals, using the sheer number of
people they represent to help defray litigation costs. Plaintiffs
and their attorneys—many of whom who excelled in litigating
class actions—are then transferred and coordinated through
multidistrict litigation.42 This provides a forum with the same
high-stakes, but without the overt judicial monitoring and error-correction built into Rule 23.
This leaves a lot of potential for both innovation and mischief. The lack of clear policing power has left judges scrambling to fill the void with class-action analogies and equitable
37
See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194–95; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at
2551–52; In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307, No.
07–1689 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 2008).
38
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat.
4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
39
See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 KAN. L. REV.
775, 777 (2010).
40
E.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014).
41
E.g., id.; Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting
that the class action is “a worthwhile supplement to conventional litigation procedure” but that it is controversial “in part because it is frequently abused”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002). Scholarship is likewise
rife with commentary on this concern. E.g., Erichson, supra note 22; Susan P.
Koniak, Feasting While the Widows Weep: Georgene v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996).
42
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
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powers.43 Without standardization, ad hoc practices develop,
creating unpredictability and variation in key areas such as
leadership appointments, compensating lead lawyers (in both
practices and percentages), and endorsing or enforcing private
settlements.44 To avoid the coordination problems inherent in
communicating with many plaintiffs’ attorneys, judges appoint
leaders to shepherd the litigation and negotiate settlement.
When those leaders perform work above and beyond what they
would do for their own clients, they should be compensated.
But there is no uniform theoretical basis or metric for doing
so.45 Consequently, judges have tinkered with methodology
and common-benefit percentages, sometimes cutting individual attorneys’ fees along the way.46
This uncertainty over attorneys’ fees prompts lawyers to
experiment. Lead lawyers are searching for—and finding—
ways to contract around judicial unpredictability via settlement. As we demonstrate, repeat attorneys with the most experience are more likely to be appointed to leadership
positions, and those in leadership design settlements.47 But
questions remain as to whether fee provisions in settlements
benefit the litigants themselves. Without class certification,
aggregate settlements are private deals that do not undergo
Rule 23(e)’s vetting process to ensure that they are “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”48

43
E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611
(E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 05–1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *17 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); see
also Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 CIN. L. REV.
389, 389–91 (2012) (criticizing the use of “quasi-class action”).
44
E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557
(E.D. La. Aug 3, 2009) (“[T]he parties have done more than simply ask the Court to
approve a settlement agreement or move for a disbursement of funds. In fact, this
Court is expressly authorized to be the Chief Administrator of the Settlement
Agreement.”); Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (2013) (“Claims belong to claimants, not to
the judge.”); Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements,
42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 127–29 (2012).
45
Burch, supra note 20, at 101–08.
46
E.g., In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174 at *19 n.30; In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 04-01596, 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (awarding costs
and lead lawyers’ fees off the top of the general settlement fund, then awarding
individual attorneys between 30 and 35%). In Vioxx, however, the judge capped
all lawyers’ fees at 32% and then allocated 8% of that amount to lead lawyers. In
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 607 (E.D. La. Aug. 27,
2008). This was later reduced.
47
Infra section II.C.2, Table 5.
48
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt

1458

unknown

Seq: 14

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

29-SEP-17

12:56

[Vol. 102:1445

Particular concerns arise in the aggregate settlement context because plaintiffs’ claims and injuries can vary dramatically; multidistrict litigation requires only a common question
of fact, not that common facts predominate as in a Rule 23(b)(3)
class.49 If tried in plaintiffs’ original fora, for a variety of reasons related to jury pool, injury severity, the lack of genetic
predispositions, and even state laws, some plaintiffs would inevitably achieve awards much higher than those offered by an
aggregate settlement.50 Thus, because their claims or circumstances present unique issues that deviate from the majority,
some plaintiffs may experience suboptimal outcomes.51
It is here that nonclass cases can divege from class actions.
In Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, dissatisfied class members—particularly those with idiosyncratic or high-value claims—can opt
out.52 Competing attorneys exist to assist and even solicit
them in this endeavor. When judges appoint class counsel and
certify a class, only class counsel stands to gain from the attorneys’ fees generated by the settlement. This incentivizes a host
of lawyers who are otherwise ineligible for that fee award to
investigate and cherry pick class members with individually
marketable claims to opt out of the class regime.53
But the conditions in nonclass multidistrict litigation stifle
the competitive check that exists in class actions in two ways.
First, as the following section explains, the overwhelming message sent by transferee judges is that leadership appointments—and the lucrative fees that accompany them—are
conditioned upon cooperation and team play.54 So, even
though plaintiffs’ attorneys are known to be an aggressive
group, their rational and calculated response may be to publicly silence their discord and play the long game by climbing
the leadership ranks. Second, there are more explicit reasons
that even one-shot plaintiffs’ attorneys do not buck. As we
49
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (requiring “civil actions involving one
or more common questions of fact” as a predicate for multidistrict litigation), with
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring such common questions of fact to “predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members” if it is the basis of a class
action (emphasis added)).
50
The scholarly literature is rife with examples that we will not attempt to
replicate here. The interested reader, however, might begin with these two
sources: NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of
the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164 (2003).
51
See Nagareda, supra note 50, at 164.
52
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(v).
53
Nagareda, supra note 50, at 168–69.
54
E.g., Hon. Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Considerations in Choosing Counsel for
Multidistrict Litigation Cases and Mass Tort Cases, 74 LA. L. REV. 391, 393 (2014).
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demonstrate in this Article, settlements themselves can be designed to force them to capitulate by tying their own financial
interests to defendants’ ability to achieve closure.55
B. Why Repeat Players are so Likely in Multidistrict
Litigations
To streamline and organize cases, transferee judges appoint a host of what we collectively term “lead lawyers”: lead
counsel, who head the litigation; steering and executive committees that make key decisions concerning litigation strategy
and settlement;56 liaison counsel, who disseminates information to other attorneys, calls meetings, and coordinates with
counsel in related state (and sometimes bankruptcy) actions;
and occasionally separate committee chairs such as discovery
and trial committees.57
Repeat players are especially likely to occupy these leadership positions for three reasons. First, by encouraging private
ordering and consensus, judicial methods for selecting lead
lawyers favor those who have litigated multidistrict litigations
in the past. Previous players know one another, have worked
together before, and are thus well positioned to take the helm.
Second, the judges appointing attorneys for leadership roles
stress attorneys’ cooperative tendencies, which advantages
lawyers with pre-existing relationships who have a track record
of working well together. Finally, while all civil litigation tends
to result in settlement over trial, the emphasis on settlement
within multidistrict proceedings is especially pronounced.
With less than three percent of cases ever returning to their
court of origin and a persistent stigma of “remand-as-failure,”58
transferee judges have a strong desire to settle these cases.
This suggests a need to select attorneys with experience settling complex matters over those who are relatively inexperienced. As discussed below, these three factors create fertile
conditions for repeat play.
55

Infra section III.B.1.
Judges occasionally appoint a specific “negotiating committee,” but lead
counsel along with the steering or executive committee typically conduct settlement negotiations.
57
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 (2004).
58
Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 144
(2013). See also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation,
75 LA. L. REV. 399, 417–18 (2014) (explaining a host of factors that make settlement particularly attractive to transferee judges).
56
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1. Lead Lawyer Selection Methods
It is often impossible to determine precisely how judges
select leaders. Attorney applications are rarely found on judicial dockets, judges tend not to be explicit about their actual
methodology, and the attorneys’ internal coordination efforts
may ultimately dictate the slate.59 For example, judges may
conduct an open application process, but may be given a
choice between two competing consensus slates or may simply
select the attorney with the most consensus support.
Still, judges typically use one of three methods: consensus
methods, competitive selection, and a hybrid of those options.
First, the consensus method relies on informal attorney networks to identify necessary leadership positions and select
their own leaders; the judge then confirms the proposed
slate.60 Second, the hybrid process allows temporary, “interim”
lead counsel to apply, nominate liaison counsel and executive
committee members, and appoint sub-committee members
while simultaneously permitting an open application process.61 As one objector in the General Motors Ignition Switch
litigation noted, however, this process “empowers [temporary
lead counsel] to handpick the majority of the Executive Committee” and leaves only a few positions “open to a transparent
application process.”62 Third, judges might implement competitive selection where the court invites submissions and
59
E.g., CAROLYN A. DUBAY, TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN THE APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION OF COMMON BENEFIT COUNSEL IN COMPLEX MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TEN MEGA MDLS 32–33, Tbl. 3 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manu-

script, on file with authors) (identifying the procedures for appointing plaintiffs’
leadership that varied substantially in levels of generality and observing “while the
court may initially dictate a competition, consensus, or hybrid approach, ultimately the actions of the attorneys themselves will dictate the level of cooperation
in the development of a leadership slate”).
60
E.g., In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pract. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1629 (D.
Mass. Dec. 14, 2004) (order granting motion to appoint counsel) (appointing
plaintiffs’ counsel’s proposed slate); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 1811
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2007) (appointing leadership counsel and observing that the
group “most closely meets the ‘private ordering’ concept, because it has support of
the larger number of plaintiffs and lawyers involved”). The first Manual for Complex Litigation recommended this approach, though it changed course by the
second edition and advised judges to oversee the appointment process. Compare
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FIRST) §§ 1.92, 4.53 (1982), with MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 20.224 (1985). Informal selection methods vary and
may simply be based on a vote of attorneys invited to a particular meeting.
61
Letter to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Aaron S. Podhurst and Harley S.
Tropin at 2, In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-md-02543
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014).
62
Letter to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Steve W. Berman, Elizabeth J.
Cabraser, and Mark P. Robinson, Jr. at 2, In re General Motors LLC Ignition
Switch Litig., No. 14-md-02543 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt

unknown

Seq: 17

29-SEP-17

12:56

2017] REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1461
chooses among them. Judges might leave the vetting to special
masters and law clerks, then treat the final selection as a confirmation hearing of sorts.63
In these latter two methods, judges sometimes permit competing attorneys to object to proposed nominees. Attorneys
who work together frequently are likely to have superior information about one another’s skills and temperament. Thus,
allowing objections can impart valuable vetting information to
judges and special masters. But repeat players may reveal that
information only if solicited privately. When judges require attorneys to serve their objections on all counsel,64 or solicit objections in open court,65 they are unlikely to receive candid
feedback. The conditions are ripe for conformity and information cascades: the relevant plaintiffs’ bar is small, lead lawyers
can influence and sometimes directly control one another’s attorneys’ fees, lawyers must often rely on each other to form
funding coalitions, and, as explained below, being dubbed “uncooperative” may render defectors ineligible for future leadership roles.66
2. Emphasis on Factors that Favor Repeat Players
When judges consider applicants for leadership positions,
they focus on experience, cooperative tendencies, and an ability to finance the litigation67—factors that favor repeat players.
63
E.g., Special Master’s Rule 23 Report Recommending Interim Plaintiff
Leadership Counsel, In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2013).
64
E.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico,
on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-2179, slip op. at 14 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial
order no. 1) (setting initial conference).
65
E.g., Lithium Ion Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 1–28.
66
See Infra subpart IV.B; see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT 28–29 (2003) (discussing the role of group identification and conformity);
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 170–74 (discussing the role of sanctions
for objectors/defectors in close-knit groups who aim to maximize their own welfare). But see Lithium Ion Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 49 (claiming that
if selected, the consensus group would not exclude objectors from receiving work).
67
Dubay, supra note 59, at 39–40, Tbl. 6 (“[T]he courts with specific orders as
to qualifications focused on experience in MDLs or complex litigation and the
ability and resources to commit to the leadership responsibilities.”). E.g., In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010,
No. 10-2179, slip op. at 13–14 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial order no. 1)
(setting initial conference); In re Boston Sci. Corp., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2326, at 9 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) (pretrial order no. 1) (“The main
criteria for PSC membership will be: (a) willingness and availability to commit to a
time-consuming project; (b) ability to work cooperatively with others; and (c) professional experience in this type of litigation.”); Duval, supra note 54, at 393
(listing “team players,” “expertise,” and “financial considerations” as factors in
selecting leadership).
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To gauge these criteria, judges often request short four to five
page submissions, and call other judges to ask about disruptive attorneys.68 Even attorneys’ submissions sometimes suggest a litany of judges who can vouch for the applicant’s
reputation and “proven ability to work well with others.”69
When writing about selection criteria, the judge who presided
over the Hurricane Katrina litigation listed “team players” as
“the primary factor in choosing lead counsel, liaison counsel,
or even membership on a steering committee.”70
In the abstract, experience and cooperation seem like positive attributes. And experience in building the relevant infrastructure to litigate claims is critical. But in reality,
emphasizing cooperation can lead to three negative effects that
may dampen the advantage that experience confers. First, it
may foster a need for attorneys to curry favor with one another
to secure lucrative positions in future leadership hierarchies.
Second, it deters dissent by implicitly labeling it as something
that should not be rewarded. Yet, dissent can be particularly
important during settlement.
The lack of dissent prompts a third concern over adequate
representation.71 Because multidistrict litigation’s authorizing
statute requires that cases share only a single common question of fact,72 claimants’ best interests are unlikely to be uni68
E.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico,
on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-2179, slip op. at 14 (E.D. La. 2010) (pretrial order no. 1)
(setting initial conference); Transcript of Proceedings on November 16, 2012 at
16–17, In re Biomet M2a-Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md2391 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 2012) (“I know most of the judges who have your MDLs,
and so I emailed them this week, gave the list of names that had been submitted,
and said, ‘Tell me anybody who [sic] I should not appoint.’”).
69
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Counsel Organizational Structure at 12, 25–26, In re
Biomet M2a-Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 16, 2012) (leadership applications of Mark Lanier and Douglass Kreis); see
also Lithium Ion Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 25–26 (“[O]ur firm was
specifically commended by both the special master and [the court] for the role we
played. And I submitted the order of special master Martin Quinn where he said
that we did a superb job in many important aspects of the case.”).
70
Duval, supra note 54, at 393.
71
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940); Burch, supra note 20, at 87–91 (arguing
that adequate representation concerns extend to multidistrict litigation); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV.
132–33, 144 (2017) (contending that Due Process protections apply to nonclass
aggregation). Monopolies in Multidistict Litigation is a solo-authored companion
piece that offers normative insights based on this Article’s empirical and network
analysis.
72
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). See Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One
Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 141 (2015) (“The dangers of MDL from the
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form. And the claimants most likely to be disserved by
nonclass multidistrict litigation—and thus most in need of dissent on their behalf—are those with unique or high-value
claims. As Professor Richard Nagareda elaborated in the class
context, “[M]embers with high-value claims are the ones most
at risk from the sale of claims en masse by class counsel as
monopolist. The greater the variance in claim value, the more
fervent the effort at variance reduction through the embrace of
a class settlement that dampens the prospect for variance at
the high end of the damage scale . . . .”73 The same logic holds
true when multidistrict proceedings are resolved through
mass—though not class—settlement, as is the case for most
product liability and sales practice proceedings.74 But incentives to dissent are weaker.
Unlike class actions, where the defendant has reason to
raise conflicting interests when battling class certification, the
controlling stakeholders in nonclass multidistrict litigation—
plaintiffs’ lead lawyers, defendants, and their attorneys—have
little economic motive to raise conflicts. Lead lawyers have two
income sources: contingent fees from their own clients and
court ordered “taxes” from plaintiffs (and their individual counsel) who benefit from leaders’ efforts. Attorneys profit from representing as many people as possible—not from recognizing
divisive interests. And defendants’ closure hinges not on the
preclusive effect of a class-wide settlement that demands adequate representation, but on convincing claimants to accept a
settlement offer. Consequently, judicial pressure toward cooperation and consensus may erode dissent and the adequate
representation that follows from it.
3. Settlement Pressure
As is the case nationwide, in multidistrict proceedings
there are far more claims than an individual judge can try in
full.75 As the proceedings in our database illustrate, this creates systemic pressure to settle that is exacerbated by the continued control that key stakeholders can exert through
centralization and the transferee judges’ reluctance to remand
perspective of the paternalism model are exacerbated by the extremely loose connection required among the claims.”).
73
Nagareda, supra note 50, at 167 (footnote omitted). This logic holds in
multidistrict litigation as well.
74
See infra Figure 1 (providing an overview of how courts resolved the products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict proceedings within our dataset).
75
Galanter, supra note 25, at 25.
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cases.76 As of May 11, 2016, of the seventy-three multidistrict
product-liability and sales-practice proceedings that were
pending as of May 2013, parties settled thirty-one proceedings
through holistic aggregate or inventory settlements, twenty
through class-action settlements, one through individual settlements, and one through bankruptcy.77 Defendants successfully used Daubert motions, summary judgment, and
arbitration to resolve ten proceedings, and the remaining ten
proceedings are still ongoing.
FIGURE 1: RESOLUTIONS WITHIN THE DATASET OF MULTIDISTRICT
PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALES-PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS
Ongoing,
13.6%
Defense
verdicts,
13.6%
Bankruptcy
settlement,
1.3%
Individual
settlements,
1.3%

Aggregate
settlement,
42.4%

Class action
settlements,
27.3%

Settlement shields practices and emerging “rules” from appellate review, making change and disruption less likely.78
Settlement likewise allows repeat players to expand their power
beyond the federal court’s jurisdiction. As transferee judges
recognize their limited authority to command parallel litigation
in state courts—at least beyond informal coordination—repeat
players may seize the opportunity to benefit from fees in competing state cases through settlement design.79 As lead lawyers who liaise with state counsel and bargain with the
defendant, they hold substantial power to negotiate master set76
See Burch, supra note 58, at 410–20; Redish & Karaba, supra note 72, at
128–29.
77
Table A1 in the appendix includes the proceedings’ consolidation dates.
78
Galanter, supra note 25, at 26.
79
E.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 764 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir.
2014). The judge has now certified a class composed of those lead lawyers, other
law firms, and clients who paid for common-benefit services and expenses that is
suing objectors for unjust enrichment and quantum-meruit claims. Downing v.
Goldman Phipps PLLC, 2015 WL 4255342 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2015).
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tlement agreements that require settling plaintiffs to consent to
common-benefit fees.80
Table 1 below summarizes the ways in which repeat players gain the upper hand in multidistrict litigation, highlights
opportunities for norms to enter the picture, and notes judicial
deference to emerging practices and claims handling.
TABLE 1: REPEAT PLAYER ADVANTAGES
Institutional and rule
Goals
entrenchment
Defendants Avoid liability
Legislation and
and their
Achieve costcentralization pools
attorneys
effective
cases and creates a
finality across single bargaining unit
state and
(§ 1407, CAFA)
federal courts Transferee judges’
reluctance to remand
Judges cannot fully
litigate every case
Little appellate review
Plaintiffs’
Bargaining
Judges’ leadership
lead lawyers credibility
selection criteria favor
Attorneys’ fees
repeat players
(from clients
Centralization creates
and
leadership structure
leadership
(§ 1407(a))
roles)
Judges cannot fully
Future
litigate each case
leadership
Little appellate review
appointments
Client
recoveries

Extra-legal norm
entrenchment and
enforcement
Ability to negotiate for
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees
Settlement offer
withdrawal as a sanction
on uncooperative
plaintiffs’ attorneys
(withdrawal provisions
in settlement)

Cooperative norms
Reciprocity concerns
Negotiating and workdistribution authority
for group
Ability to socially and
financially sanction noncooperative plaintiffs’
lawyers

Additional
advantages
Specialized
expertise

Specialized
expertise and
experience
Some judicial
deference to
claims
handling
Ability to
finance the
litigation
Judicial and
peer
references

C. Costs and Benefits of Repeat Play—Why This Matters
As Table 1 illustrates, multidistrict litigations are ripe not
only for repeat players to influence, create, and change the
standard practices—“rules,” for short—that occur within them,
but also to entrench those rules. First, appellate oversight is
rare. Cases often conclude through private settlements that
are not appealable;81 interim rulings, such as those appointing
lead lawyers or creating common-benefit funds, are not dispositive and are reviewable only through an extraordinary writ of
mandamus or subsequent dismissal;82 and, in the unlikely
event of appellate review, courts use the deferential abuse-of80

See infra section III.B.2.
Some judges have expressly waived parties’ ability to appeal through their
common-benefit fund participation agreement. E.g., In re C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic
Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2187 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (Pretrial Order
No. 54, at 5–6).
82
See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376–78 (1981); Redish & Karaba,
supra note 72, at 142.
81
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discretion standard.83 Second, because formal, hard-and-fast
rules are scarce, transferee judges tend to look to their predecessors and peers for guidance.84 Without much external scrutiny, past practices may become best practices and experienced
repeat players could cite, replicate, and improve upon procedures that benefitted them while discarding those that did not.
Repeat players can shape leadership appointments in at
least three ways. First, the consensus-selection method (and
even methods where the judge formally selects but defers to
private ordering) allows repeat players to proffer a preordained
leadership slate.85 Second, even if the transferee judge employs a competitive-selection process for key positions like lead
and liaison counsel as well as the steering committee, chosen
leaders can then select attorneys to perform the work or serve
on sub-committees, like a discovery committee. Third, in openselection or hybrid-selection methods, repeat players may
vouch for one another’s cooperative abilities, providing a chorus of support—either in writing or in open court—for the unofficial consensus nominees.86
Once appointed, leaders can likewise work to maximize
their common-benefit fees. Because there is no firm doctrinal
ground to guide judges in awarding these fees,87 ample opportunities exist for lead lawyers to influence their compensation.
First, judges often implement leaders’ proposed common-benefit orders, and defer to leaders’ requests to raise fees during the
proceeding.88 Second, in some multidistrict proceedings,
judges may create a fee-allocation committee comprised of the
83
E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-30446, 388 Fed. Appx. 391 (5th
Cir. July 16, 2010) (using the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the allegation that the judge should have recused himself based on his dual roles as
judge and Chief Administrator of the Master Settlement Agreement).
84
For example, the opinions in Zyprexa heavily influenced the oversight of
Guidant and Vioxx. E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 650 F. Supp. 2d
549, 560 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2009); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 574 F.
Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05–1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *17–18 (D.
Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).
85
For example, in the Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litigation, when plaintiffs’ attorneys could not reach a complete consensus as to who would represent
the indirect purchasers before the court’s hearing, Dan Becnel noted, “I tried to—
when we came down here to—to have three [lead counsel], make a deal, and—and
Mr. Berman decided not to. So the bulk of us think Mr. Cotchett and the Cabraser
firm are excellent.” Lithium Ion Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 51.
86
E.g., id. at 59 (“And we are also supporting the Cotchett, Lieff motion, but
we are glad to work with all three firms.”).
87
See Burch, supra note 20, at 102–09.
88
See Dubay, supra note 59, at 22–23, 54–55; infra notes 239–242 and
accompanying text.

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt

unknown

Seq: 23

29-SEP-17

12:56

2017] REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1467
principal lead lawyers.89 This means that at any given time,
lawyers could pressure other attorneys through their influence
over fees in concurrent multidistrict proceedings. Third, repeat
players may understand—and perpetuate—norms about
which kind of work is most beneficial (and thus most deserving
of enhanced compensation), perform that work themselves,
and delegate less profitable tasks to others.90 Finally, as the
settlement designers, lead lawyers could insert fee provisions
into settlements, negotiate their fees directly with the defendant, and contract around judicial fee orders to tax settling
state-court plaintiffs via master settlement agreements.91
To be sure, repeat play can generate positive effects, too.
First, repeat players capitalize on economies of scale and their
acquired knowledge is imperative. It takes expertise to comprehend the science behind injuries, understand the risks of various litigation strategies, build the infrastructure that
accompanies a multidistrict proceeding, and manage litigation
effectively.92
Second, repeat actors are intimately familiar with the myriad layers of administrative service providers who work behind
the scenes from claim initiation to resolution, but may renege
on their price structuring and deliverables. These providers
range from client-intake call centers and client-referral services
that promise to deliver client leads through advertising93 to
89
E.g., In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2015) (case management order no.
71) (creating a fee committee with five of eight members appointed by co-lead and
liaison counsel).
90
E.g., Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Allocation and Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses at 13–14, In re
NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2014) (discussing the novelty and difficulty of the questions addressed by counsel and the skill
requisite to perform the legal work as factors used to distribute fees). Kristine
Kraft, Paul Rheingold, Steven Blau, and Roger Denton were appointed as lead
counsel in NuvaRing. In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 8, 2008) (order appointing lead lawyers). Combined, their three firms
netted $7.4 million of a total $10,123,395.00 of fees awarded to ten total firms.
Kraft and Denton’s firm, Schlicter, Bogard & Denton LLP received $6.9 million of
the $7.4 million. Exhibit 1 to Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Allocation and Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses at
13–14, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16,
2014).
91
See infra subsection III.C.2.b.
92
Amanda Bronstad, ‘Good Ol’ Boys Club’ in MDL, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 28, 2015
(quoting Richard Arsenault as saying, “A lot of deference should be given to
experienced plaintiffs’ counsel who have been in these wars and understand what
kinds of teams they need to put together.”).
93
E.g., GACOVINO LAKE [https://perma.cc/Z58W-VDE7];THE SENTINEL GROUP
[https://perma.cc/GZB9-8Y8R]; RELION-GROUP [https://perma.cc/2E5T-397E].
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marketing firms,94 document repositories, and claims administrators.95 In this way, multidistrict litigation is merely one
facet of a broad network of stakeholders.96 Because there is
little direct judicial oversight and regulation, particularly with
regard to pricing document databases and claims administration, repeat play incentivizes providers to follow through on
their commitments. Yet, this also creates opportunities for service providers to conspire with repeat players in ways that disserve plaintiffs.
Third, when repeat players get involved in a multidistrict
litigation, it signals to other plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants
that it’s a high-stakes case. Certain firms are known to intensively vet cases with experts long before filing a complaint.
Consequently, their reputation may encourage others to advertise and recruit clients, and prompt cases to settle more quickly
than they otherwise might. Those settlement values may likewise reflect repeat players’ knowledge about previous awards,
which helps prevent defendants from using information asymmetries to their advantage.97
Finally, attorneys who have worked together closely in the
past will know more about one another’s work habits and expertise than the judge. As lawyers form leadership groups for a
particular case, they might design their team to maximize one
another’s strengths. Moreover, because they work together frequently, repeat players can use social and financial sanctions
to enforce norms and promote efficiency beyond simplistic efficiencies such as avoiding duplicative discovery and pre-trial
motions. For example, it makes sense to ostracize disorganized
attorneys with poor work product, those who are inefficient
time-managers with inflated billable hours, and those who cannot complete assignments on time. Yet, reciprocal relationships might likewise mean that attorneys who would otherwise

94
E.g., CONSUMER ATTORNEY MARKETING GROUP [https://perma.cc/3LWKEK3M]; ILAWYERMARKETING [https://perma.cc/23YG-EVSB].
95
E.g., BROWNGREER [https://perma.cc/2CM5-2RLR]; Garretson, [https://
perma.cc/7GB9-VT6X]; Providio [https://perma.cc/M7GH-EATM]; RUST CONSULTING [https://perma.cc/Q8X5-4YMK].
96
See KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 123–24 (noting that any set of nodes in
network theory inevitably has real-life ties to other nodes that affect the network
and the flow).
97
See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571,
1581–84, 1599–1600 (2004).
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be excluded for their various failings may nevertheless remain
if lead or liaison counsel is indebted to them.98
Given the degree of specialization and success required to
fund firms’ capital contributions in multidistrict litigation, this
segment of the plaintiffs’ bar is relatively small; reciprocal relationships form, and an attorney’s reputation matters immensely. Playing the long game may not only allow repeat
players to play for rules and reap the advantages those rules
provide, but also empower those attorneys to influence and
control group dynamics in ways that could impinge on client
representation.99
Accordingly, whether the positive gains outweigh the potential negatives remains to be seen.100 Because repeat players
have so much control with so few external safeguards and so
little incentive to draw attention to deals that may not favor
litigants over lawyers, there is a pressing need to examine both
who repeat players are and the deals they design. Consequently, we turn now to those tasks using a dataset of repeat
players in products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict
litigation.
II
EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING REPEAT PLAY:
THE SOCIAL NETWORK
Before we can analyze repeat players’ impact, we must first
determine whether and the degree to which they exist. Our
previous work suggests that they do,101 but the data in this
Article offer some benefits not provided by past work, which
focused solely on plaintiffs’ attorneys. We not only include
plaintiffs’ lawyers in our network, but incorporate defense attorneys and law firms as well, which provides a more complete
picture of repeat play. Additionally, this Article does not just
focus on who appears most often; it also examines their leader98
Scholars have consistently claimed that social factors, and not necessarily
expertise, may influence organizations and institutions. E.g., Katz & Stafford,
supra note 16, at 459.
99
Inadequate representation can raise due process concerns. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 45 (1940); Burch, supra note 20, at 87–91 (arguing that adequate representation concerns extend to multidistrict litigation); Burch, supra note 71, at 132–33,
144 (contending that Due Process protections apply to nonclass aggregation);
Redish & Karaba, supra note 72, at 151.
100
For an important perspective that efficiency should not outweigh Constitutional due process protections such as adequate representation, see Redish &
Karaba, supra note 72, at 146–51.
101
Burch, supra note 20, at 95–101; Williams et al., supra note 20, at 141.
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ship positions, which helps gauge the participation and influence levels that allow attorneys to control litigation and shape
settlements. After establishing who is in the repeat-player network, we then analyze the publicly available nonclass settlements that these leaders create.
A. Data Description and Sample Selection
To achieve some sense of how prevalent repeat players (individual attorneys and law firms) are in multidistrict litigation,
we built an original dataset that includes all judicially appointed lead plaintiff and defense lawyers in all products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict litigations pending as of
May 14, 2013. This date allows us to examine an array of
resulting settlements.102 A list of these 73 proceedings appears
in Appendix A1; collectively the proceedings include approximately 312,555 actions.
If repeat players exist, these proceedings should provide a
representative sample for several reasons. First, products liability and sales practices constitute well over one-third of all
multidistrict proceedings—the largest segment by far.103 And
looking beyond the simple count of multidistrict proceedings to
the actual number of actions contained in each shows that
products liability comprise up to 92% of all those pending actions.104 Second, examining pending cases on a certain date
includes data from cases centralized over a twenty-two-year
102
We identified the relevant proceedings using the Panel’s list of pending
multidistrict litigations as of May 14, 2013. Because the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill proceeding dealt with issues similar to products liability, such as physical
harm and economic loss, we also included it. One case mentioned on that May
14, 2013 list was excluded because the orders were not electronically available (In
re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., which began in 2000).
Only interim counsel appointments were available in In re Plavix Marketing, Sales
Practices and Products Liability Litigation and In re Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid
Brake Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation. Finally, we
included five separate multidistrict litigations over pelvic-repair systems transferred to the Southern District of West Virginia. The transferee judge named the
same 62 attorneys as lead lawyers in four of those five cases. Coding those four
litigations as one would reduce the percentage of repeat play: repeat attorneys
would hold 54.9% of all lead-lawyer positions and repeat law firms would occupy
73.2% of the available positions. Because the Panel could have created one large
multidistrict case, but chose not to do so, we treat these five proceedings
separately.
103
CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 12 (2012) (showing 34 sales practices multidistrict litigations and
72 products liability litigations out of 291 total multidistrict litigations).
104
Samuel Issacharoff, Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics 3, DUKE LAW CTR.
FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES (2015), https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/
october2015/materials/ [https://perma.cc/8ZMQ-RYUR].
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span.105 Third, to the extent possible, we included data from
all orders appointing lead lawyers (plaintiffs’ steering committees, plaintiffs’ liaison committees, discovery committees, trial
committees, defendant’s lead counsel, etc.), not just lead counsel. While lead counsel has the most power in any proceeding,
the additional steering or executive committee members follow
them closely. Once lead lawyers negotiate a master settlement,
liaison counsel also plays a vital role in marketing the deal to
individual lawyers both inside and outside the multidistrict
proceeding—including those attorneys litigating solely in state
courts. When taken as a whole, this information should give
an accurate sense of the scale of repeat play.
Our data confirmed that repeat players populate most multidistrict leadership positions. On the plaintiffs’ side, repeat
players (attorneys who held more than one leadership position
within our dataset) held 767 out of 1,221 available leadership
roles, or 62.8%. Fifty attorneys were named as lead lawyers in
five or more multidistrict litigations and those 50 attorneys
occupied 30% of all plaintiff-side leadership positions.106 A full
list of those attorneys appears in Appendix A2, and a partial list
of the top 25 high-level players appears subsequently in Table
3. Repeat play among plaintiffs’ law firms was even more evident. Again, even though only 40.7% of law firms were repeat
players (i.e., had more than one lawyer from that firm appointed to a leadership position within the dataset), lawyers
from those 70 firms occupied 78% of all available leadership
positions.107 Seventy law firms had attorneys who were named
to five or more leadership roles, and attorneys from those firms
were appointed to well over half of all lead-lawyer positions.
Put starkly, 16% of the involved law firms held nearly 54% of all
leadership positions. Appendix A3 contains a list of plaintiffs’side repeat-player law firms with the greatest number of
appearances.
On the defense side, repeat players held 73 of 414 leadership positions, or 17.6%. Of course, defense lawyers are rarely
105
As noted in footnote 102, one older case was excluded because the orders
were not available electronically, but In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation,
which began in 1991, is included.
106
This statistic does not count lawyers who occupied multiple leadership
positions within the same multidistrict litigation.
107
Two judges named entire law firms as lead or liaison counsel. Where
possible, only the attorneys from the named law firm who were “to be notified by
the court” on PACER were included in the data. The number of available leadership positions from the law firm perspective was 1,222, and lawyers from firms
named more than once occupied 957 of those leadership positions.
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judicially appointed to leadership positions; the defendant
hires the law firm directly and different partners may spearhead distinct matters. So, evidence of repeat play by those
attorneys’ law firms was more indicative for defendants: of the
414 available leadership positions, attorneys from repeatplayer defense firms occupied 341, or 82.3%, of those leadership roles. The 19 defense firms whose attorneys occupied five
or more leadership positions claimed 41.5% of those roles. A
list of defense-side repeat-player law firms with the greatest
number of appearances appears subsequently in Table 4.
While this Article focuses on nonclass proceedings, information on repeat play in class-action settlements occurring
within multidistrict proceedings nevertheless provides some
useful comparisons. Class actions tended to have fewer leadership positions, ranging from 22 at the high end to 4 at the low
end, and averaging 11.5 positions per proceeding, 43.9% of
which were filled with repeat players. By contrast, plaintiffs’
leadership positions in nonclass cases ranged from 62 in the
pelvic-mesh cases (American Medical Systems, Ethicon, Boston
Scientific, and C.R. Bard) at the high end to 3 positions
(Coloplast and Zimmer Durom Hip Cup) or 1 firm (Mirapex) at
the low end.108 Nonclass multidistrict litigations averaged 21.9
positions per proceeding, 75.2% of which were filled with repeat players. Excluding the unusually high number of pelvicmesh appointments (in American Medical Systems, Ethicon,
Boston Scientific, and C.R. Bard) lowers the average number of
positions to 15.9, with repeat players occupying 61%. More
detailed information on the level of repeat play by proceeding
appears subsequently in Table 5.
B. The Network Methodology
We used a social network analysis to depict the connections between lawyers and multidistrict proceedings. Network
analysis has long been used to study relationships between
leaders such as judges and corporate board members.109 Not
only does graphing the network demonstrate if there are inter108
The New England Compounding litigation was excluded from these calculations given its unique bankruptcy status.
109
See Katz & Stafford, supra note 16, at 457; Garry Robins & Malcolm Alexander, Small Worlds Among Interlocking Directors: Network Structure and Distance
in Bipartite Graphs, 10 COMPUTATIONAL & MATHEMATICAL ORG. THEORY 69, 74 (2004).
This work builds on the early contributions of Jacob Moreno, who pioneered
networks analysis’s use in diagramming social relationships between individuals
holding leadership positions. JACOB L. MORENO, WHO SHALL SURVIVE? A NEW APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN INTERRELATIONS 86, 153 (1934).
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connections within data (or not), the graphs can highlight the
relative importance of a set of entities to the larger group, such
as particular multidistrict proceedings or attorneys within
those proceedings.110
Accordingly, we built an adjacency matrix and employed a
two-mode (actors and events) projection of a bipartite network,
also known as an affiliation network, to graph the ties between
lawyers judicially appointed to leadership positions (the actors)
in multidistrict proceedings (the events).111 Bipartite networks
avoid the loss-of-information problems sometimes associated
with converting an affiliation matrix to one-mode data.112 As
corporate boards do for corporations, lead lawyers make the
full range of pretrial litigation decisions for all of the plaintiffs
within the group and, because leaders are judicially appointed,
we know exactly who is and is not a member, which gives the
network clear boundaries (also known as edges).113
While we cannot identify friendship, cooperation, or even
contrarians by looking directly at the actors, we can look at
agents’ ties to one another and generate hypotheses about their
influence on both social connections and legal norms.114 For
example, our network graphs formal affiliations based on leadership appointments, but friendships, joint ventures, and rivalries may contribute to or result from these formal
appointments.115 While some social network studies anticipate linkages and hierarchies,116 we make no such assumptions about the structure of leaders at the outset. Instead, by
looking at statistical measures of degree centrality (the number
of connections a node—attorney or proceeding—makes),
betweenness centrality (how often a node is on a path between
two other nodes), and eigen values (how close one powerful
node is to another), we can begin to understand how the network formed, and who is most important within it. From there
110

DAVID KNOKE & JAMES H. KUKLINSKI, NETWORK ANALYSIS 50–59 (1982).
See M. E. J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45
SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & APPLIED MATHEMATICS REV. 167, 174, 204 (2003) (discussing the
use of bipartite graphs for mapping social networks).
112
See STEPHEN P. BORGATTI ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL NETWORKS 239 (2013).
113
See Robins & Alexander, supra note 109, at 74.
114
See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 232 (“In analyzing two-mode data,
we typically [assume] that attending the same event is either an indicator of an
underlying social relationship between the actors or a potential opportunity for
one to develop.”).
115
See KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 122–23.
116
E.g., Salmon A. Shomade & Roger E. Hartley, The Application of Network
Analysis to the Study of Trial Courts, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 144 (2010) (anticipating
linkages between groups from courts’ unification plans).
111
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we can formulate and explore hypotheses about control, influence, and power as well as theoretical propositions about information flow, norm development, and norm entrenchment.117
We provide an overview of network terminology below in Table
2.118
TABLE 2: SOCIAL NETWORK TERMINOLOGY
Social
network term
Node
Centrality

Degree
centrality

Betweenness
centrality

Eigen value
centrality

Applied definition
An attorney or multidistrict proceeding in the network
The position of a node (attorney or proceeding) in the network;
more central nodes have more potential to influence others, act as
gatekeepers, and receive “flows” such as information or financial
support; central actors tend to have more social capital
Indicates how many ties one attorney or proceeding has to other
attorneys or proceedings within the data; nodes with high degree
centrality tend to be those that insiders might flag as integral to
complex proceedings
Indicates how often a node is on the shortest path to other nodes
(think of a bridge, for example); nodes with high betweenness
centrality tend to have a high potential for gatekeeping or tolltaking and have power because they can filter, distort, or threaten
to stop transmitting information
Indicates how close one node is to other well-connected nodes;
nodes with high eigen values tend to indicate popularity—they
connect to well-connected others

In the context of multidistrict proceedings, these network
insights are especially important. As other studies have
shown, attorneys in multidistrict litigation are repeat
players.119 The more often they appear in proceedings, the
more likely they are to be appointed to leadership positions,
and being in leadership means having the opportunity to play
for rules. As we discussed in subpart I.C, the same attorneys
appearing in multiple proceedings could have advantages and
disadvantages. Leadership consistency offers a number of
benefits, both to the litigants who rely on experienced repeat
players to win their case and net a high reward, and to judges
who may have handled few, if any, multidistrict proceedings
and perceive the attorneys as a reliable source of casemanagement information.
Of course, repeat players’ informational advantage may
also have a downside: less high-profile attorneys who have
extensive experience in the trenches of discovery committees
117

See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 164.
This table uses information from BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at
163–75, to summarize definitional concepts.
119
Burch, supra note 20, at 96–97; Nagareda, supra note 50, at 141.
118
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are closed out of opportunities to gain leadership experience,
leaders’ perspectives and heuristics may be less diverse, and,
even when privy to unique information that others lack,
attorneys may not share it for fear the dominant group member
will disapprove.120 Such dissent might be particularly useful
in both ensuring adequate representation for “outliers”
(plaintiffs with idiosyncratic injuries or circumstances) and for
the group as a whole.
Knowing what the network looks like and who is key within
it provides additional information to researchers examining the
role of attorneys in multidistrict litigation. Before we delve into
the network, however, a word of caution is in order. While our
list of products-liability proceedings contains a substantial
number of the cases centralized by the Panel as well as a
substantial number of the attorneys in those proceedings, it is
not exhaustive. Without a complete list of all proceedings, it is
difficult to speculate about how important specific attorneys or
litigations are to the entire world of complex litigation. As
such, our discussion focuses on the importance of attorneys
and proceedings in the network created with our data. The
scope of the data suggests that the results are generalizable
outside the realm of products liability (and indeed the results
below are consistent with past work), but we cannot say with
certainty that what we find is true across all proceeding types,
or even for all products-liability cases for all time. Nonetheless,
the importance of products-liability proceedings to the larger
world of civil litigation suggests this is an appropriate starting
place to examine attorneys’ relationships as well as their
influence.
C. Results
1. The Social Network
Using our database of 73 products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict litigations, we graphed the network among
the participating lead lawyers. Our data include plaintiff and
defense attorneys, the leadership roles they held, how many
total appearances they make in the data, the size of the proceeding, and how many appearances the attorney’s firm made.
While snapshots of each of our graphs appear below, readers
interested in a searchable, magnified view of the labels (which
indicate individual attorneys and proceedings) in the network
120
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE
28–29 (2009); Burch, supra note 20, at 98–101.
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can download the original images.121 Our look at the connections among attorneys is purely exploratory. Graphing the network among entities provides insights into data that cannot be
seen in thousands of rows; it shows us what’s hidden in plain
sight. Still, our work is meant to generate hypotheses, not to
test them per se.
FIGURE 2: LEAD LAWYER NETWORK, PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALESPRACTICE MULTIDISTRICT PROCEEDINGS

The network created among lead products-liability lawyers
in our data is quite cohesive. As Figure 2 above shows, there is
a single densely populated network, and two much smaller
isolated networks on the periphery. The smaller networks include litigation over Porsche’s plastic coolant tubes122 and the
121
Downloadable and searchable graphs are available under the “multidistrict
litigation” category at https://perma.cc/CB 2X-VWG4.
122
In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. Plastic Coolant Tubes Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 11-md-2233 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
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Factor VII or IX blood products litigation.123 These two litigations do not share any leadership counsel common to the rest
of the larger network. Unlike many other proceedings in our
data, the blood products litigation involved only three lead lawyers and contained 337 total actions, making it a relatively
small proceeding in both overall size and number of leadership
counsel. Porsche Cars featured the unusual event of a judge
appointing an entire firm co-lead counsel. The whole proceeding encompassed only eight actions, again making it a small
proceeding relative to others in our data. The size of the proceedings suggests that they are outliers as they may not present the case management challenges typical of most
multidistrict products-liability proceedings.
The larger network features more of the principal productsliability proceedings that appear in the academic literature and
in media coverage. Both proceedings and attorneys have key
roles in the network’s cohesion. Four of the pelvic-mesh cases
are in the center of the network,124 and most connections radiate from this core set of proceedings. The pelvic-mesh cases
comprise 55% of all cases pending in multidistrict proceedings—the largest grouping since the asbestos litigations.125
Given the number of participating attorneys and the appointment of the same 62 attorneys to leadership in four of the five
pelvic-mesh proceedings, this is hardly surprising. What is
interesting, however, is how these proceedings feature some
but not all of the attorneys most central to the network. Looking specifically at degree centrality emphasizes this point.

123
In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 986 (N.D.
Ill. 1996).
124
In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2326 (S.D.
W. Va. 2016); In re C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2187
(S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2327 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2325 (J.P.M.L. 2012).
125
See Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by District, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (Oct. 15 2015) [https://perma.cc/EZ7N-QVCM].
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FIGURE 3: LEAD LAWYER NETWORK, PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALESPRACTICE MULTIDISTRICT PROCEEDINGS, DEGREE
CENTRALITY HIGHLIGHTED

Figure 3 above highlights degree centrality. In general, the
more central a node (actor or event) is to a network, the more
opportunities it has to influence others and receive information
and support from others in the network.126 That, in turn, gives
those actors social capital; people who are more central to a
network may have opportunities and advantages that those on
the periphery lack.127 Higher degree centrality—the number of
ties a node has to other nodes—may indicate influential insiders who are well positioned to control how information flows
over the network and to spin that information in ways that
benefit them.128 As such, the literature on repeat players sug126
127
128

See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 164.
See id.
See id. at 164–65.
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gests that degree centrality is a particularly apt measurement:
attorneys appointed as leaders in more proceedings can make
more connections.129
Those events with the highest degree centrality include
four of the pelvic-mesh proceedings130 and litigation against
the New England Compounding Pharmacy.131 The attorneys
with the highest degree centrality include Richard Arsenault,
Daniel Becnel, Jr., Dianne Nast, Christopher Seeger, and Jerrold Parker. Many of these attorneys appear in a substantial
number of proceedings, both generally and in our data specifically. Arsenault is featured in eighteen proceedings in our
data, Seeger appears in sixteen, Becnel and Nast each appear
in fourteen, and Parker appears in eleven. They are well connected, so to speak, and presumably exhibit judicially preferred characteristics of experience, cooperative tendencies,
and an ability to finance the litigation.
Interestingly, however, the proceedings in which these attorneys appear are not the same. Becnel and Seeger do not
appear as leaders in any of the five proceedings with the highest degree centrality: the pelvic-mesh cases against C.R.
Bard,132 American Medical Systems,133 Boston Scientific,134
and Ethicon,135 or the New England Compounding Pharmacy
litigation.136 In fact, what links these two lawyers with the rest
of the network is their participation in Accutane.137 Of the
eleven proceedings most central to the network (based on all
measures of centrality) Becnel appears in only two and Seeger
appears in only one. It appears that the importance of these
two attorneys to this network is in linking those proceedings
129

See Williams et al., supra note 20, at 158.
In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2326 (S.D.
W. Va. 2016); In re C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2187
(S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2327 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2325 (J.P.M.L 2012).
131
In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:13-md-2419 (D. Mass. 2013).
132
In re C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2187 (S.D.
W. Va. 2014).
133
In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2325
(J.P.M.L. 2012).
134
In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2326 (S.D.
W. Va. 2016).
135
In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2327 (S.D. W.
Va. 2014).
136
In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:13-md-2419 (D. Mass. 2013).
137
In re Accutane (Isotrentinoin) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1626, No. 8:04-md2523 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
130
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and attorneys in the upper right portion of the network to the
central nest. Extending this analysis to other types of multidistrict proceedings may show a different pattern.
FIGURE 4: LEAD LAWYER NETWORK, PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND
SALES-PRACTICE MULTIDISTRICT PROCEEDINGS,
BETWEENNESS HIGHLIGHTED

Figure 4 illustrates betweenness. Betweenness centrality
measures how often a given attorney or proceeding falls along
the shortest path to other attorneys or proceedings.138 It helps
to identify which events or actors might play either a gatekeeping or toll-taking role, for nodes with high betweenness rank138
See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 174; Katz & Stafford, supra note 16,
at 495 (“[B]etweenness centrality is often used to identify the bridges between
different communities and clusters. To identify these gatekeepers, betweenness
calculates the shortest paths (known as geodesics) between all pairs of vertices,
identifies the frequency of each node appearing on those paths, then normalizes
the statistic.”).
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ings can act as information brokers—relaying, distorting, or
disrupting the information they pass to others.139 When attorneys form the shortest distance from one attorney to the next,
they might engage in rent extraction or gatekeeping; the efficiency of the network requires information to flow through
them, which increases their power within the network. These
lawyers join otherwise disparate groups. Attorneys with high
betweenness rankings may likewise broker litigation financing
arrangements between plaintiffs’ law firms or negotiate global
settlements.
Looking at the betweenness ranking, we find a list of lead
attorneys similar to those in the degree centrality discussion,
but a different list of proceedings. While New England Compounding Pharmacy is also on this list,140 the other proceedings
are different, including Accutane,141 Fosamax,142 Propecia,143
and Yasmin/Yaz.144 Interestingly, unlike the degree centrality
list (composed of the pelvic-mesh cases—involving a medical
device), here we see pharmaceutical litigations. The attorney
list—Richard Arsenault, Daniel Becnel, Jr., Dianne Nast, Joe
Rice, and Christopher Seeger—is almost exactly the same, with
the exception of Joe Rice appearing in place of Jerrold Parker.
Rice makes an interesting series of connections in the network,
tying the largest multidistrict litigation of all time, Asbestos,145
and litigation over BP’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill146 to all
other proceedings. Without his appearance in leadership in
both proceedings, neither Deepwater Horizon nor Asbestos
would connect to the rest of the nest in our data.
Overall, the network shows a strong, cohesive center,
where attorneys participate in leadership in many multidistrict
proceedings, and a set of attorneys with relatively few connections, both to proceedings and other lead lawyers. To clarify
the center of the network, we kept the attorneys participating
139

See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 174–75.
In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:13-md-2419 (D. Mass. 2013).
141
In re Accutane (Isotrentinoin) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1626, No. 8:04-md2523 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
142
In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y 2014).
143
In re Propecia (Finasteride) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-02331 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
144
In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. & Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 09-md-02100 (S.D. Ill. 2010).
145
In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. 875, No. 2:02-md-875 (E.D.
Pa. 2013).
146
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico on
April 20, 2010, No. 10-md-02179 (E.D. La. 2012).
140
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in leadership in two or more multidistrict litigations in our data
(thereby excluding 786 attorneys, or 78% of the data) and
regraphed the network, which appears below.147
FIGURE 5: ATTORNEYS WITH TWO OR MORE LEADERSHIP
APPEARANCES, PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALES-PRACTICES
MULTIDISTRICT PROCEEDINGS

If we focus on the attorneys with at least two leadership
appearances, we see a similar picture. Figure 5 above shows
the same network after removing all the attorneys who appear
as leaders in only one multidistrict proceeding in our data.
This figure shows more clearly how closely related four of the
147
Pruning nodes is a well-established and recommended approach to analyze
large networks. BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 252.
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pelvic-mesh litigations148 are to each other in terms of the participating attorneys. In fact, as Figure 6 below shows, if we look
at the entities with the highest eigen values (attorneys and
proceedings closest to other key attorneys and proceedings), we
find that those four proceedings include all five attorneys who
have the highest eigen values: Richard Arsenault, Dianne Nast,
Jerrold Parker, Jane Conroy, and Michelle Parfitt.
Figure 6 illustrates how much pull those four pelvic-mesh
proceedings have on the current picture of multidistrict litigation provided by our data. Highlighting eigen value indicates a
way to consider an attorney’s importance in a relative way: how
important are the attorneys to which that attorney is connected?149 While degree centrality measures the number of
connections, and betweenness measures how key an attorney
is to connecting other parts of the network efficiently, eigen
value considers the importance of the connections an attorney
makes. It is perhaps here where the centers of power are most
likely to be seen. The four pelvic-mesh proceedings, and the
attorneys participating in them, are central to the network of all
attorneys with a leadership role in two or more products-liability proceedings. This is likely in part because so many of the
attorneys in one pelvic-mesh litigation are in another (which is
why they rank so highly in degree centrality), but also because
these cases involve some of the attorneys most common to all
multidistrict products-liability proceedings. In other words,
the related nature of the pelvic-mesh proceedings strengthens
ties among lawyers who were already interacting with each
other more than one would find outside the realm of complex
litigation.

148
In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2325
(J.P.M.L 2012); In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2326 (S.D. W. Va. 2016); In re C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2187 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 2327 (S.D. W. Va. 2014).
149
See Williams et al., supra note 20, at 158.
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FIGURE 6: ATTORNEYS WITH TWO OR MORE LEADERSHIP APPEARANCES
IN PRODUCTS-LIABILITY OR SALES-PRACTICES MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATIONS, EIGEN VALUE HIGHLIGHTED

2. Centrality’s Importance to Leadership Selection
What do these interlocking connections mean in practice
and how do they affect the nature of the proceedings themselves? The relative importance of lead attorneys to the overall
network only begins to tell the story of the role these repeat
players have in the world of multidistrict litigation, for all kinds
of things can flow through a network—money, trust, influence,
information, reputations, and even sanctions.150 Each and
every tie provides leaders with opportunities to influence and
be influenced. And, as Professor Stanley Milgram demon150

See KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 125–26.
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strated with his famous crowd experiment (where research assistants stared up at a nearby window on a city street), the
more people who exhibit a particular behavior, the more likely
others are to copy that behavior.151 Add to that that interconnected agents can have emergent properties—that networked
people can demonstrate complicated, shared behavior without
explicitly coordinating with each other—and hypotheses about
the potential for norm development and entrenchment can be
extensive.152
What we can determine with certainty is that attorneys
with more appearances in proceedings are more likely to be
appointed to leadership positions, and attorneys in leadership
design master settlement agreements. If we look specifically at
the type of leadership roles we can begin to separate those
making the rules from those merely playing by them. All the
attorneys in our network served in some leadership position
within a multidistrict litigation, but even among this highly
experienced group of attorneys there are those who appear
more often than others. Table 3 below shows how much leadership experience the top twenty-five repeat plaintiffs-side
players in our dataset have, followed by Table 4, which illustrates the leadership experience among the defense bar by
firm.153

151

CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 18, at 24.
See id. at 26 (discussing emergent properties and likening them to more
than the sum of their parts—“A cake has a taste not found in any one of its
ingredients”).
153
Judicial appointments to leadership roles on the defense side are rare and
typically used only in cases where the number of defendants requires more formal
coordination. More comprehensive lists of leadership appearances by the top 50
attorneys in our data, as well as firm experience, is available in the Appendix.
152
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Liaison Counsel
Appearances

Executive Committee
Appearances

Steering Committee
Appearances

Other Leadership
Appearances

Total Leadership
Appearances

MDL Appearances

Attorney
Arsenault, Richard
Seeger, Christopher
Nast, Dianne
Becnel, Jr., Daniel
Parker, Jerrold
Conroy, Jayne
Parfitt, Michelle
Levin, Arnold
Robinson, Jr., Mark
London, Michael
Crump, Martin
DeBartolomeo, A.J.
Flaherty, Yvonne
Osborne, Joseph
Thompson III, Fred
Shkolnik, Hunter
Restaino, John
Cartmell, Thomas
Dugan, II, James
Zonies, Joseph
Abrams, Rachel
Blizzard, Edward
Oliver, Alyson
Lanier, W. Mark
Flowers, Peter

Lead Counsel
Appearances

TABLE 3: HIGH-LEVEL REPEAT PLAYERS – PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL

3
1
2
0
0
1
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
3
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

1
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
3
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
3
2

13
12
12
11
10
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5

2
2
2
0
0
1
0
3
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0

21
21
19
14
11
12
11
15
14
14
8
7
7
7
12
9
10
8
7
7
6
6
6
11
8

18
16
14
14
11
10
10
9
10
9
8
7
7
7
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
8
7

TABLE 4: HIGH-LEVEL REPEAT PLAYER DEFENSE FIRMS WITH FIVE
OR MORE LEADERSHIP APPEARANCES
Defense Law Firm

Attorney MDL
Appearances

Venable LLP

23

Williams & Connolly LLP

13

Bryan Cave LLP

12

Multidistrict Proceedings
Fosamax (MDL 1789)
Mirapex
Propecia (Finasteride)
Nexium (Esomeprazole)
Prempro
Vioxx
Chantix
Nexium (Esomeprazole)
Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van (No. II)
Fosamax (MDL 1789)
Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastics
Propecia (Finasteride)
Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate)
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Defense Law Firm

Attorney MDL
Appearances

Butler Snow LLP

12

Ulmer & Berne LLP

12

Covington & Burling LLP

10

Tucker Ellis LLP

10

Fulbright & Jaworski LLP

9

McGuire Woods LLP

7

Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP

7

Baker & Daniels LLP

6

Ice Miller LLP

6

Jones Day

6

Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLP

6

Reed Smith

6

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

5

Halleland Lewis Nilan &
Johnson

5

McDermott, Will, & Emery

5

Wheeler Trig O’Donnell LLP

5

Multidistrict Proceedings

Fosamax (MDL 1789)
Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys.
Propecia (Finasteride)
Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Marketing
Celexa and Lexapro
Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing
Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene
Watson Fentanyl Patch
Accutane (Isotrentinoin)
Fosamax (MDL 1789)
Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate)
Nexium (Esomeprazole)
OrthoEvra
DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., ASR Hip Implant
Propecia (Finasteride)
Coloplast Corp. Pelvic Support Sys.
New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
Fosamax (MDL 1789)
Denture Cream
Coloplast Corp. Pelvic Support Sys.
New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
ConAgra Peanut Butter
New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration
Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip
Implant
New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup
Zimmer Nexgen Knee Implant
Accutane (Isotrentinoin)
Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene
Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobuturator Sling
Nexium (Esomeprazole)
FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde
C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair System
Boston Scientific Corp Pelvic Repair Sys.
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
Mirapex
Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) (No. II)
NuvaRing
American Medical Systems Inc., Pelvic
Repair Sys.
OrthoEvra
Levaquin
DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., ASR Hip Implant
Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Marketing
Propulsid
Mirapex
Levaquin
Baycol
Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/
Dexfenfluramine)
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”)
IKO Roofing Shingle
Gadolinium Contrast Dyes
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
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Typically, highly experienced attorneys serve on a steering
committee in addition to serving in one other leadership
position within a proceeding.154 The attorneys shown to be
central to the network above have the greatest amount of
experience in leadership positions as well. Again, while these
results are not surprising (more experience in these
proceedings means more opportunities for leadership, and one
leadership appointment makes the next leadership
appointment more likely), it is important to point out that
attorneys who are central to a network of products-liability
proceedings are not only powerful for their connections to other
attorneys, but for their leadership in conducting and shaping
the proceedings. These attorneys broker the master
settlements that resolve these cases. This raises the question
of what their deals look like, as well as the unanswerable
question about how those deals might differ if courts appointed
non-central attorneys to leadership.
III
EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING THE DEALS THOSE REPEAT
PLAYERS DESIGN
How might well-connected lead lawyers’ ties affect the settlements they design? As Professors Nicholas Christakis and
James Fowler demonstrated, social networks can have
profound effects on people’s lives—they can spread joy and
health and help us understand how markets and democracies
function, but they can also spread things like depression, violence, and even suicide.155 They find that all social networks
“tend to magnify whatever they are seeded with.”156 We can
only guess at the seeds in multidistrict litigation. As Part I
explained, transferee judges try to select cooperative, experienced, and well-financed leaders and presumably encourage
efficiency in accordance with the authorizing statute’s mission.157 But, because all of these leaders are agents, we must
154
We might begin to think of this as positional inequality—the notion that
some are better off based on where they are located within the network. Their
situational inequality might be causally related to positional inequality, for if
judges routinely select those attorneys with more financial means (situational
inequality due to socioeconomics) then they are likely to be better connected
positionally within the network. See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 18, at 31.
155
CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 18, at 31.
156
Id.
157
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (authorizing the Panel to transfer cases when
doing so “will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions”).
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also consider the possibility of a more troubling seed: an agent
may better herself at her principal’s expense.
To be clear, there is no way for us to reliably test what flows
through our network.158 By looking at the settlements that
well-connected leaders implement and the fee practices they
influence, however, we can formulate better-informed hypotheses about the network’s effects. Using a variety of sources
(including media stories and docket entries from the proceedings), we analyzed the publicly available nonclass settlements
that resulted within our dataset, the accompanying lead lawyers’ common-benefit fee awards, and the attorneys in leadership roles who designed the settlements. Specifically, as
indicia of advantages that repeat players might enjoy that oneshotters do not, we looked for provisions that one might argue
principally benefit the lead lawyers and the defendants, and
not necessarily the plaintiffs. We focused our inquiry on four
main types of provisions: (1) those that induce claimants to
settle and thereby generate closure for defendants; (2) those
compensating lead lawyers; (3) those that allow unclaimed
funds to revert to the defendant; and (4) those that reduce
payout amounts to latecomers who do not have counsel as of
the settlement date.
This enterprise has two notable caveats. First, settlement
provisions designed to induce claimants to settle can deliver
closure that unlocks gains for the settling plaintiffs that may
not exist otherwise—a “peace premium.”159 Defendants, particularly those with publicly traded stock, are often eager to
end lawsuits and ease shareholders’ minds about future business prospects. In class actions, defendants accomplished closure through a combination of preclusion doctrines and
walkaway provisions, which allowed defendants to withdraw
the settlement offer if too many class members opted out. The
need for finality persists even when multidistrict litigation concludes through a nonclass, aggregate settlement. But, without
a certified class, closure requires more creativity in settlement
design. The trouble comes both in the lack of structural assurances of adequate representation in appointing leaders on the
front end, and on the back end in policing the line between
acceptable settlement tactics that rational claimants should
accept because the offer is too good to decline and those that
158
We do not have access to attorneys’ financial assets, for example, and for
reasons explored elsewhere, attorneys are unlikely to be candid if interviewed.
See Burch, supra note 71, at 155–58.
159
Nagareda, supra note 50, at 162.
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claimants can’t refuse in The Godfather sense—a gun to the
head accompanied by assurances that either the person’s signature or brains would appear on the contract.160
Second, lead lawyers may perform the lion’s share of the
work in any given multidistrict litigation, and they should be
compensated for their performance insofar as it benefits claimants.161 But allowing lead lawyers to negotiate their fees with
the defendant—either by inserting fee-related provisions within
the settlement or by having the defendant pay their fees directly—is troubling. Leadership fees are big business: using a
settlement agreement to contract around the initial judicial fee
award in Guidant, for example, boosted lead lawyers’ fees by
$29.7 million.162 And while defendants must be on board with
the deal, they are not naı̈ve; fee provisions may cost them nothing if they come from the plaintiffs’ share of the funds, yet
defendants receive a powerful bargaining chip that they might
exchange for things like lower settlement amounts, higher participation rates, or stringent criteria to qualify for settlement
money.163 Moreover, through settlement consent, lead lawyers
might be able to tax state-court plaintiffs who eluded federal
jurisdiction and the transferee judge’s common-benefit assessment. Perhaps lead lawyers confer a benefit here as well, but
the fee assessments are typically uniform and not tailored to
quantum-meruit principles.164
Class settlements can include coercive provisions designed
to deliver closure, too.165 In the Sulzer hip implant litigation,
for example, defendant Sulzer hired Dickie Scruggs, a noted
plaintiffs’ attorney, to design a class settlement that minimized
opt outs.166 Among other provisions, that settlement placed
liens on virtually all the defendants’ assets in favor of settling
class members such that the opt outs would have to wait at
least six years before receiving payment.167 And if Sulzer set160
Richard Nagareda has written about class action provisions extensively in
these terms. Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The
Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2003).
161
See Burch, supra note 20, at 130–35.
162
In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05md-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *2–4, 16 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); Burch, supra
note 20, at 81.
163
See Silver & Miller, supra note 11, at 134.
164
See Burch, supra note 20, at 103–09, 128–35.
165
For an in-depth overview of these provisions, see Nagareda, supra note 50,
at 204–19.
166
Jess Bravin, Sulzer Medica Reaches Novel Class-Action Pact, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 16, 2001, at A1.
167
In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 354 (E.D. Ohio
2001).
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tled with an opt-out claimant on more favorable terms than
those in the settlement, it would have to pay all participating
class members more as well.168 Functioning a bit like a doomsday device that would never actually be triggered, the idea was
to signal to opt-outs that they would never receive a better deal
than what the settlement offered. As Scruggs described it, “[I]f
anybody opts out, they still have to try their case, win their
case, win their appeal, and then there would be no assets to
satisfy their judgment, because they are all pledged to the
class.”169
But the circumstances in multidistrict proceedings make
closure and fee-related clauses even more troubling. In Sulzer,
objectors (whose attorneys stood to gain fees only if their objection improved the deal170) challenged the legitimacy of those
provisions on appeal, which led settlement designers to boost
benefits to class members, change the deal’s questionable provisions, and remove the lien—all before the Sixth Circuit could
rule on the original settlement.171 Nonclass aggregate settlements, by contrast, are private deals with no appellate review
to correct error or threaten change. Judges do not ensure the
settlement is fair under Rule 23(e), subject lead lawyers to adequate representation scrutiny under Rule 23(a)(4), or have explicit control over attorneys’ fees under Rule 23(h). As such,
nonclass settlements lack key structural failsafes. Thus,
clauses that appear to principally benefit the attorneys rather
than their clients raise significant concerns.
Turning to the settlements themselves, of the seventy-three
products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict litigations
in our dataset, we were able to obtain private, nonclass settlements in ten multidistrict litigations (three of which generated
two settlements each for a total of thirteen settlements),172
class settlements in twenty, and one bankruptcy-related settlement.173 One of the nonclass settlements (in the American
Medical Systems litigation) is a partial settlement: it covers
168

Id.
Bravin, supra note 166, at A1.
170
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting
that when objectors confer a benefit on the class, they should receive attorneys’
fees).
171
See Nagareda, supra note 50, at 205 n.240 (2003) (“A preliminary ruling by
the Sixth Circuit did not bode well for that court’s ultimate disposition of the
settlement and, as such, spurred negotiations that ultimately recast the deal.”).
172
Propulsid, DePuy ASR Hip Implant, and Yasmin/Yaz each generated two
settlement agreements.
173
For an overview of the proceedings’ resolutions, see supra Figure 1 and
accompanying text.
169
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only the claimants represented by two law firms, not all the
pending claims. Because the other settlements in that case
were confidential, we could not determine whether that settlement was representative of the others. Twenty-one other multidistrict litigations in our data have also settled; however,
those aggregate settlements were confidential and nonpublic.
Because this Article focuses on the practices and norms
that develop outside of directly authorized judicial supervision
under established class-action principles, we limited our analysis to the thirteen publicly available nonclass settlements that
resulted from ten multidistrict litigations. Our analysis, while
limited, nevertheless provides some interesting insights into
what the settlements brokered by repeat players look like. And
though the number of publicly available private settlements
was relatively small, the proceedings in which those settlements occurred collectively included 64,107 total actions.174
Table 5, infra, shows the settlements in our data by settlement
date, from oldest to newest. We indicate the settlements we
examined using boldface type.

174
Using the most recent data available on the proceedings, the Pending
MDLs by District as of July 15, 2016 (or our earlier 2013 information where the
proceedings were no longer pending), the proceedings contained the following
number of actions: Propulsid 474, Vioxx 10,320, Fosamax 1,141, Yasmin/Yaz
11,858, DePuy ASR 9,877, Biomet 2,607, NuvaRing 1,895, Actos 5,111, American
Medical Systems 20,231, and Zimmer Durom 593.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt

unknown

Seq: 49

29-SEP-17

12:56

2017] REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1493

Percentage of
Plaintiff-side
Repeat Players

Publicly Available

Class-Action
Settlement

First Settlement
Date

Coordination
Date

TABLE 5: AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS OCCURRING WITHIN THE
DATASET BY SETTLEMENT DATE (AS OF JULY 15, 2016)

MDL
Number

MDL Name

875

Asbestos

7/29/91

1980s

No

No

16% (2/12)

986

12/7/1993

5/8/1997

Yes

Yes

15% (2/13)

1203

Factor VII or IX
Concentrate Blood
Prods.
Diet Drugs
(Phentermine,
Fenfluramine,
Dexfenfluramine)

1/6/1998

1/3/2002

Yes

Yes

15% (2/13)

1355
1431

Propulsid
Baycol

8/7/2000
12/18/01

4/30/2004
6/30/2005

No
No

Yes
No

90% (10/11)
68% (15/22)

1657

Vioxx

2/16/2005

11/9/2007

No

Yes

50% (14/28)

1742
1836
1909

Ortho Evra
Mirapex
Gadolinium
Contrast Dyes
ConAgra Peanut
Butter
Human Tissue
Avandia
Mentor Corp.
ObTape

3/1/2006
6/22/2007
2/29/2008

10/13/2008
2/29/2009
4/15/2009

No
No
No

No
No
No

71% (15/21)
100% (1/1 firm)
72% (13/18)

6/17/2007

5/29/2009

No

No

26% (5/19)

6/13/2007
6/11/07
12/3/08

1/30/2010
6/01/2010
6/8/2010

No
No
No

No
No
No

33% (2/6)
79% (19/24)
66% (4/6)

1845
1763
1871
2004
1928
1967

Trasylol
Bisphenol-A
Polycarbonate
Plastic

4/7/2008
8/13/2008

7/6/2010
1/3/2011

No
Yes

No
Yes

62% (10/16)
22% (2/9)

1873

FEMA Trailer
Formaldehyde
Kugel Mesh Hernia
Patch
Heparin

10/24/2007

3/14/2011

Yes

Yes

18% (2/11)

6/22/2007

7/1/2011

No

No

75% (9/12)

6/6/2008

12/1/2011

No

No

57% (12/21)

10/8/2010

1/1/2012

Yes

Yes

0% (0/4)

8/10/2010

1842
1953
2188

2179

Apple iPhone 4
Marketing & Sales
Practices
Deepwater Horizon

4/18/2012

Yes

Yes

36% (7/19)

12/19/2011

5/02/2012

Yes

Yes

80% (4/5)

2023

Sketchers Toning
Shoe
Bayer Corp.
Combination
Aspirin

4/14/2009

5/16/2012

Yes

Yes

50% (6/12)

1507
2047
1958
2284
1943

Prempro
Chinese Drywall
Zurn Pex Plumbing
Imprelis Herbicide
Levaquin

3/4/2003
1/13/2010
8/21/2008
10/20/2011
6/13/2008

6/8/2012
6/14/2012
10/15/2012
10/19/2012
10/30/2012

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

12.5% (3/24)
70.5% (12/17)
70% (7/10)
60% (3/5)
62% (5/8)

2223

Navistar Diesel
Engine
Toyota Motor Corp.
Unintended
Acceleration
Chantix
(Varenicline)

4/13/2011

11/1/2012

Yes

Yes

44% (8/18)

4/9/2010

12/26/2012

Yes

Yes

40.9% (9/22)

10/1/2009

1/15/2013

No

No

75% (12/16)

2308

2151

2092

2100
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Yasmin and Yaz
(Drospirenone)
Watson Fentanyl
Patch

10/1/2009

3/15/2013

No

Yes

89% (17/19)

8/7/2012

6/4/2013

No

No

0% (0/8)

2233

Porsche Plastic
Coolant Tubes

5/23/2011

7/26/2013

Yes

Yes

0.07% (1/13)

2197

DePuy ASR Hip
Implant

12/3/2010

11/11/2013

No

Yes

80% (25/31)

1789

Fosamax

11/21/2011

12/9/2013

No

Yes

66% (8/12)

2325

American Medical
Systems
Land Rover LR3
Tire Wear

2/7/12

4/30/2013

No

Semia

100% (62/62)

2/23/09

5/30/2013

Yes

Yes

66% (4/6)

2372

2008
2391

Biomet Magnum
Hip Implant

10/2/2012

1/31/2014

No

Yes

58% (14/24)

1964
1629
2385
2387

NuvaRing
Neurontin
Pradaxa
Coloplast Corp.
Pelvic Support Sys.

8/22/2008
10/26/2004
8/8/2012
8/6/2012

2/7/2014
5/30/2014
5/28/2014
9/22/2014

No
Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No
No

35% (6/17)
50% (4/8)
70% (19/27)
100% (3/3)

2333

MI Windows &
Doors
New England
Compounding
Pharmacy

4/23/12

12/24/2014

Yes

Yes

46% (6/13)

2/12/2013

2/13/2015

Bankr.b

Yes

42.8% (3/7)

Building Materials
Corp. of Am.
Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic
Repair

10/11/11

4/22/2015

Yes

Yes

69% (9/13)

2/7/2012

3/10/2015

No

No

100% (62/62)

Actos
(Pioglitazone)
C.R. Bard, Inc.
Pelvic Repair Sys.
Boston Scientific
Corp. Pelvic Repair
Sys.
Ford Motor Co.
Spark Plug & 3Valve Engine

12/29/2011

4/29/2015

No

Yes

68% (18/22)

10/12/2010

6/23/2015

No

No

98% (62/63)

2/7/2012

12/7/2015

No

No

100% (62/62)

2/8/2012

1/26/2016

Yes

Yes

83% (5/6)

9/9/2010

2/11/2016

No

Yes

100% (3/3)

12/20/2008

5/11/2016

Yes

Yes

61% (8/13)

2419

2283
2327
2299
2187
2326

2316

2158
2100

Zimmer Durom
Hip Cup
Whirlpool Corp.
Front Loading
Washer

a
This settlement was included as an exhibit to a Securities and Exchange
Commission filing; some confidential parts of it were redacted. The agreement is
between American Medical Systems and Freese & Goss, PLLC and Matthews &
Associates.
b
New England Compounding Pharmacy is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings, so the settlement is a bankruptcy trust.
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A. Settlement Attorneys
Before examining these thirteen settlements, we must first
confirm that the repeat players we previously discussed participated in leadership positions when these agreements were
brokered. Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs’ attorneys who frequently appeared as leaders in our data were key to these
settlements.
The multidistrict proceedings we examined varied in terms
of the number of repeat players appointed to leadership positions. Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, American Medical Systems,175
and Propulsid were at the high end, with repeat players occupying 100, 100, and 90% of the plaintiffs’ leadership positions,
respectively. Yasmin/Yaz and DePuy ASR followed suit with
repeat players in 89 and 80% of those positions. Actos and
Fosamax had slightly fewer repeat players, with 68% in Actos
and 66% in Fosamax. Both Biomet and Vioxx filled around half
of the plaintiffs’ leadership positions with repeat players—58%
in Biomet and 50% in Vioxx. And NuvaRing contained the fewest repeat players, with 35%.
What became apparent in reviewing the settlements, however, was that it was not so much the sheer number of repeat
players involved in a proceeding that seemingly affected the
outcome, but the influence of a relatively small cadre of highlevel, well-connected repeat players occupying the most powerful positions who actively designed and implemented those settlements. Our findings here are consistent with those in other
disciplines; in research and development laboratories, for example, about six individuals act as information and technological gatekeepers, or bridges, in network terms.176 Table 6 below
shows which attorneys with the highest degree centrality (to
take one measure) appeared as leaders in the examined
settlements.

175
The judge handling pelvic-mesh cases appointed the same sixty-two attorneys as lead lawyers in four out of the five pelvic-mesh multidistrict proceedings
he was handling.
176
Thomas J. Allen & Stephen I. Cohen, Information Flow in Research and
Development Laboratories, 14 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 12, 13 (1969).
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TABLE 6: PARTICIPATION IN NONCLASS SETTLEMENTS BY REPEAT
PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS WITH THE HIGHEST
DEGREE CENTRALITY
MDL
Number MDL Name
1355
1657
1789
2100
2197
2391
1964
2299
2325
2158

Propulsid
Vioxx
Fosamax
Yasmin and Yaz
(Drospirenone)
DePuy ASR Hip Implant
Biomet Magnum Hip Implant
NuvaRing
Actos (Pioglitazone)
American Medical Systems177
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup

Richard
Daniel
Dianne Jerrold Christopher
Arsenault Becnel, Jr. Nast Parker
Seeger
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
No

No
No
No

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
No
Yes

No
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
No

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

B. Settlement Provisions and Lead Lawyers’ Fees
Given the interconnections among these attorneys in our
data, it should not be surprising to find commonality in the
settlement provisions. What may be surprising, however, is
how closely these settlement provisions mirror one another,
beginning with the two Propulsid settlements. The Propulsid
settlements were the first nonclass settlements in our data,
and, as we show, they appear to be the template that repeat
players sought to replicate and improve upon in future settlements. As such, we introduce these settlements in detail to
highlight the means by which leaders resolved mass litigation
without the class device—principally through widespread
plaintiff participation requirements. As we note, these settlements not only helped end the litigation for the defendant, but
paid plaintiffs’ lawyers directly for doing so. The question that
lingers, however, is whether these developments benefitted
one-shot plaintiffs.
In the first Propulsid settlement, three provisions worked
in concert to induce closure. First, the deal required 85% of
those with death claims and 75% of those with injury claims to
enroll in the program before the agreement took effect.178 Second, to entice plaintiffs to participate, the settlement escalated
the defendant’s payment amounts based on higher participa177
Note that we have only one of several aggregate settlements negotiated with
American Medical Systems. The others are confidential.
178
MDL-1355 Term Sheet § 1.B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter First Propulsid Settlement]. The plaintiffs’ steering committee represented about 4,000 people, 300 of whom allegedly
died from using Propulsid. Johnson & Johnson Unit in Legal Settlement Over
Propulsid Suit, DATAMONITOR INDUSTRY NEWSWIRE, Mar. 2004.
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tion percentages and included a $4 million “bonus” if 100% of
non-death claimants enrolled.179 Third, an “opt-out” form accompanied the settlement even though the settlement was not
a class action and all claimants had to affirmatively “opt in.”180
Designed for plaintiffs who refused to enroll, this form explained that the client’s chosen attorney was no longer permitted to represent her under the settlement’s terms and
authorized counsel to withdraw from the representation.181
So, the client was opting out of representation—not just declining the settlement offer.
Somewhat like arbitration, submitting claims to the settlement program extinguished them, win or lose. After four years,
the panel of three physicians reviewing claims deemed only 11
of 1,356 claimants eligible for payouts.182 Still, the program
could not bind absent plaintiffs as a class action does, and the
first settlement did not cover 2,000 state-court plaintiffs or
5,000 claimants who had not filed as of February 1, 2004.183
Nevertheless, by using a lodestar analysis that estimated
the attorney’s fee from the money deposited for awards instead
of the money actually paid to claimants, the court awarded the
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee a fee of $22.5 million.184 No one
objected.185
At the end of the first settlement only 32 out of 4,245
plaintiffs satisfied the settlement’s claims criteria and were eligible for relief.186 Collectively, those 32 plaintiffs received little
more than $3.66 million.187 The remaining settlement funds
went elsewhere: two donations of more than $8 million each
179

First Propulsid Settlement, supra note 178, § 3.B.
Opt Out Form for Propulsid MDL Settlement, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. 2004) [http://perma.cc/72JG-APEF].
181
Id.
182
Joint Report 62 at 2, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355
(E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2008); Janet McConnaughey, Two Propulsid Settlements; A
Handful of Checks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 29, 2008.
183
Parties Announce New Propulsid Settlement to Resolve Remaining State,
Federal Claims, BNA CLASS ACTION LITIG. RPT., Jan. 27, 2006. Earlier reports
estimated that 12,000 people had not yet sued at the time of the first settlement.
Johnson & Johnson Unit in Legal Settlement, supra note 178.
184
In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. June 2, 2005)
(order); First Propulsid Settlement, supra note 177, § 19.
185
In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. June 2, 2005)
(order) (“No objections were made to the Motion.”).
186
Joint Report No. 89 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants Liaison Counsel at 1–2, In
re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011).
187
See Joint Report No. 97 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. July 31, 2012). The precise total was $3,665,167.74. Not surprisingly, it was not included in the Joint
Report but derived from numbers provided in that and previous reports.

R
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were awarded to Canada’s Prepulsid Resolution Program and
charitable organizations;188 $40 million reverted to defendant
Johnson & Johnson;189 and $12 million remained in the settlement fund.190
Given the continued need to resolve the remaining claims,
in December of 2005, reportedly at the behest of counsel representing state-court plaintiffs, the federal Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee and the State Liaison Committee negotiated Propulsid II. This $15 million settlement mostly mirrored the first
one, but required 90% of death claimants and 95% of personalinjury claimants to consent before becoming effective.191 This
time, the physician panel found only 5 out of 1,767 claimants
compensable, and Johnson & Johnson paid slightly more than
$2.85 million from the settlement fund.192 Nevertheless, the
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee requested over $4.1 million in
fees.193 Once again, no objections to that motion appeared on
the docket, and the court granted the request.194 The court
also granted a joint motion to revert $5 million of the second
188
In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2009)
(order granting joint motion for an order authorizing distribution of MDL 1 settlement fund). The money went to Louisiana Health Public Initiative, even though
claimants were geographically dispersed throughout the country. Joint Report
No. 95 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012).
189
Joint Report No. 95 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012). Historically, reversion clauses have served as red flags for self-dealing in class settlements. Int’l Precious Metals Corp. v. Walters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1223 (2000)
(O’Connor, J., statement respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of
certiorari).
190
Joint Motion and Order for Partial Disbursement of Settlement Funds to
Defendant Johnson & Johnson, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2011); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355
(E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011) (order).
191
Parties Announce New Propulsid Settlement, supra note 183; McConnaughey, supra note 182.
192
The exact number is 2,852,070, and it does not include the 2,059 claimants who enrolled in the program, had their claims extinguished, but did not
submit claim forms. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees at 5 and Ex. B (Re: MDL Settlement Program II), In re Propulsid Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. 2012).
193
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees Ex.
B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012) (re:
MDL Settlement Program II).
194
In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2012)
(order). The only objections to fee requests that we found were by firms that
objected not to the amount of overall fees but to that firm’s cut. E.g., Zimmerman
Reed P.L.L.P.’s Response in Partial Objection to the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for the Distribution of Additional Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement
Costs, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2012);
Objection to the PSC’s Motion for Distribution of Specific Attorney’s Fees Awards

R
R
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settlement fund to the defendant, as well as the remaining
balance of all settlement and administrative funds.195 As the
litigation concluded, lead lawyers requested and received the
additional six-percent holdback fund put in place at the beginning of the litigation for common-benefit fee awards, which
taxed settlements that occurred before the master settlement
agreements, and equaled $397,860.196
The lead lawyers in Propulsid noted that their settlements
were the first of their kind to globally resolve mass litigation
without the class device and, as such, “promise[d] to become
the template” for future cases.197 Using Propulsid as a baseline, we examined the other eleven settlements in our database
for similar closure and common-benefit fee provisions. We
find, overwhelmingly, that the settlement model produced in
the Propulsid settlements is carried out in various respects
through all other settlements in our database. The principal
variations in the other settlements included how many plaintiffs had to participate in the settlement for it to take effect and
whether settlement money reverted back to the defendant in
the end. Table 7 below shows how the small group of attorneys
negotiating, designing, and implementing future settlements in
our database consistently applied, again and again, both the
closure provisions and the common-benefit fee awards created
in Propulsid.

and for Expenses and Reimbursements, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00md-1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2009) (filed by Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.).
195
In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2012)
(order terminating the claims of all enrollees in the Second MDL Resolution Program and authorizing return to the defendants the balance of the settlement fund
and administrative fund after all payments due thereunder have been made); In re
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011) (order).
196
Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final
Distribution of Remaining Funds, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md1355 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2014); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355
(E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014) (order).
197
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committees Motion for
Award of Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs, In re Propulsid Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. May 3, 2005).

MDL Name

Propulsid (2004)

Propulsid (2005)

Vioxx

Yasmin and Yaz
(Drospirenone)
Gallbladder

Fosamax

Yasmin and Yaz
(Drospirenone)
ATE

DePuy ASR Hip
Implant (2013)

DePuy ASR Hip
Implant (2015)

MDL
Number

1355

1355

1657

2100

1789

2100

2197

2197

“Best efforts”

Yes
By
Defendant

Yes, 85%

Yes, 94% revision
surgery

Yes, 94%

Yes, 97.5% overall;
96% death or severe
injury; and 100% set
for trial or jury
selection

Yes, 100%

Yes, 90% all claims
state & federal

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Escalating
percentages
based on
timing of
attorney
consent

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes, directly

Yes, directly

Aspects of
leaders’ fees
negotiated
with
defendant

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Payouts
reduced for
latecomers
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By
Defendant

Not explicit

No

CommonCasefund
census
holdback
provision increased
mid-stream

Yes, 90% state and
No
federal death cases;
95% non-death; 100%
Achord

Yes, 85% death;
75% injury

Defendant can
walkaway unless
plaintiffs with X% of
certain claims
participate in the
settlement
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“Best efforts”

“Best efforts”

Yes

Yes

Not explicit

Yes

Yes

Yes

Attorney
withdrawal
provision

unknown

Yes

Yes

“Best efforts,”
plus
automatically
enrolled

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Attorney
recommendation
provision

Common Benefit Fee and Settlement FundDistribution Practices

1500

Yes

“Settlement”
contract with
participating
attorneys

Closure Provisions
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Biomet Magnum
Hip Implant

NuvaRing

Actos

American Medical
Systems

Zimmer Durom
Hip Cup

1964

2299

2325

2158

MDL Name

2391

MDL
Number

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

“Settlement”
contract with
participating
attorneys

Yes

Not explicit

Not explicit

Not explicit

Attorney
withdrawal
provision

No, participation No
was judicially
mandated

Yes

“Best efforts”

“Best efforts”

No

Attorney
recommendation
provision

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes, 90% must accept Yes
offer without
mediation, and 67% of
mediated cases must
accept offer

Yes, 95% overall,
100% of cases set for
trial

Yes, 95% overall plus
95% of specific
categories

Yes, 95% overall plus
95% of specific
categories

No

No

No

No

No

No

Escalating
percentages
based on
timing of
attorney
consent

No

No

No

Payouts
reduced for
latecomers

Yes

Yes

Not available No

Yes

No

Yes, directly

Aspects of
leaders’ fees
negotiated
with
defendant

Common Benefit Fee and Settlement FundDistribution Practices
CommonCasefund
holdback
census
provision increased
mid-stream

Yes, 90% revised hips, In part
67% “mediation” - for
enhanced or contested
cases

Defendant can
walkaway unless
plaintiffs with X% of
certain claims
participate in the
settlement

Closure Provisions
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Looking closely at Table 7 above and Figure 7 below shows
that even though all the settlements share and replicate certain
features, some resemble one another even more closely. Take
DePuy ASR, NuvaRing, Actos, and Yasmin/Yaz, for example.
All employ what we call “third generation”198 versions of both
attorney-withdrawal provisions and defendant-walkaway provisions in which designers enlist judges to issue “case-census”
orders that enable leaders to take stock of both pending and
unfiled claims in determining whether plaintiff participation
requirements are met.199 These four litigations shared a host
of common lead lawyers, lead law firms, and claims administrators as Figure 7 below visually demonstrates. For instance,
Richard Arsenault was a lead lawyer in DePuy ASR, NuvaRing,
and Actos, and Chris Seeger and Mark Robinson, Jr. helped
lead DePuy, Yaz, and Actos.
Network models share inherent limitations in depicting
real-world events: “nodes” in real life have multiple flows with
other nodes, like claims administrators. Figure 7 shows, for
example, that BrownGreer, PLC administered all four of these
settlements.

198
199

Infra Figure 8 and accompanying text.
Infra notes 211–19 and accompanying text.

R
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FIGURE 7: LINKING COMMON ATTORNEYS, FIRMS, AND
ADMINISTRATORS IN DEPUY ASR, ACTOS, NUVARING,
AND YASMIN/YAZ
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1. Closure Provisions
As Propulsid illustrates, without a class-action judgment’s
claim preclusive effect, settlement designers have experimented with a number of alternative closure devices that are
sometimes used alone, and sometimes used in concert with
one another. Yet, all the settlements in our database uniformly
featured one key departure from conventional settlements: unlike typical settlements between plaintiffs and defendants,
these deals were made between lead lawyers and the defendants, and most of them explicitly required the plaintiff’s individual attorney to become a signatory if she wanted to enroll a
single client in the settlement program. By shifting the dealmaking entity from the client to the lawyer, these offers leveraged the attorney-client relationship itself to achieve closure
and tied plaintiffs’ attorneys’ financial self-interest to one another as opposed to a particular client. Put differently, we saw
a uniform departure from the conventional contingent-fee
model where an attorney’s fees increase solely based on a particular client’s outcome.
In common parlance, we refer to these interrelated closure
provisions as follows: (1) walkaway provisions, which release
the defendant from any contractual obligations if a certain percentage of plaintiffs do not consent to settle; (2) case-census
provisions, which rely on the presiding judge to order all attorneys to register their filed and unfiled claims by a certain date
such that the defendant can use that number as the denominator in calculating compliance with the walkaway percentage;
(3) attorney-recommendation provisions, which require participating attorneys to recommend the deal to all of their clients,
and (4) attorney-withdrawal provisions, which instruct attorneys to withdraw from representing clients who do not consent
to settle.
Across all the settlements in our database, we found the
most common closure provision to be the defendant’s ability to
walk away from its settlement offer if too few plaintiffs accepted. The threshold for the defendant to abandon the settlement varied somewhat. In Vioxx, if fewer than 85% of plaintiffs
accepted, Merck could walk away and leave the plaintiffs and
their attorneys with nothing.200 In Fosamax, the stakes were
even higher. If a single claimant or attorney failed to sign onto
the deal, Merck (again the defendant) could void the agree200
Master Settlement Agreement § 1.2.8.1, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
05-md-01657 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement].
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ment.201 Alternatively, Merck could reduce the settlement by
however much it would have paid the non-participating claimants (as determined by the allocation committee).202 Both DePuy ASR settlements took a middle path, requiring 94% of
claimants to accept before the deal took effect.203
Several settlements included an overall participation
threshold as well as specific levels for various claims categories. The two Yasmin/Yaz settlements set the overall walkaway
percentage at 90% of all eligible gallbladder claimants,204 and
97.5% of all arterial-thromboembolic-event (“ATE”) claimants.205 But, in the ATE settlement, all plaintiffs set for jury
selection or trial had to consent, as did 96% of plaintiffs with
death and severe-injury cases.206 Similarly, in American Medical Systems, plaintiffs’ attorneys were required to secure releases from 95% of all claimants plus 100% of cases set for
trial.207 In Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, 90% of all claimants had to
accept the defendant’s offer without mediation and 67% of
those who opted for mediation had to take the offer or the
defendant could terminate the settlement program at its discretion.208 Actos and NuvaRing shared nearly identical provisions that included an overall participation rate of 95% plus
95% of wrongful-death claims, and 95% of various specific categories, such as venous thromboembolism and arterial thromboembolism in NuvaRing and cystectomy in Actos.209 The
thresholds were somewhat lower in Biomet. Biomet had no
201
Master Settlement Agreement ¶ 11, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014) (certification and joinder of counsel and
claimant’s counsel) [hereinafter Fosamax Settlement].
202
Id.
203
Settlement Agreement § 17.1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2013) [hereinafter 2013
DePuy Settlement]; 2015 ASR Settlement Agreement § 17.1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2,
2015) [hereinafter 2015 DePuy Settlement].
204
Settlement Agreement §§ 9.01, 9.02, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone)
Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2013)
[hereinafter Yaz Gallbladder Settlement].
205
ATE Master Settlement Agreement §§ 3.01, 3.02, In re Yasmin and Yaz
(Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill.
Aug. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Yaz ATE Settlement].
206
Id.
207
Master Settlement Agreement § II.H, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair
Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2325 (S.D. W. Va. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter
American Medical Systems Settlement].
208
U.S. Durom Cup Settlement Program Agreement §§ V.A, V.B, In re Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Zimmer Durom Settlement].
209
Master Settlement Agreement § 10.02, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab., No. 08md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter NuvaRing Settlement]; Master Settle-
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funding obligations without the consent of 90% of those with
revised hips who would receive a base award subject to various
deductions, and 67% of the mediation cases—where one party
believed it was entitled to enhanced or reduced payments.210
Case-census provisions, a relatively new development,
work in concert with walkaway thresholds to create the percentage’s denominator. By jointly petitioning both the transferee judge and the coordinating state-court judges, census or
“registration” provisions produce case-management orders
that require all attorneys who represent a single plaintiff in the
issuing courts to register all claims relating to the product in
which the attorney has an interest (broadly defined to include
“any financial interest of any kind whatsoever”) by a certain
date.211 These orders cover all claims, including those that are
unfiled, pending in other courts, or controlled by attorneys who
decline to recommend the deal to any client.212 Failing to comply with the judicial census triggers a show-cause hearing for
counsel to satisfactorily explain the noncompliance or face dismissal. The Vioxx settlement,213 both DePuy ASR settlements,214 the second Yasmin/Yaz settlement,215 the Actos
settlement,216 the NuvaRing settlement,217 and the Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup settlement218 all featured census provisions.219 Of these, the Zimmer Durom Hip Cup settlement is
noteworthy, for the judge not only ordered all plaintiffs’ attorneys to register all of their clients, but also ordered all plaintiffs
to participate in the settlement and stayed the proceedings
ment Agreement § 5.02, In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-md2299 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Actos Settlement].
210
Settlement Agreement Between Biomet, Inc. and Plaintiffs Executive Committee ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2014).
211
E.g., In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299 (W.D.
La. Apr. 28, 2015) (order regarding settlement agreement and deadlines); In re
NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2014) (case
management order of January 29, 2014 (supplemental census of claims)); In re
Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 3:09md-02100 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2015) (case management order no. 77 (census of
claims)).
212
E.g., In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-md-2299 (W.D. La.
Apr. 28, 2015) (order regarding settlement agreement and deadlines); Actos Settlement, supra note 209, § 1.02.
213
Vioxx Settlement, supra note 200, at ¶ 1.1.
214
2013 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, at art. 3, §§ 3.1-3.3; 2015 DePuy
Settlement, supra note 203, at art. 3, §§ 3.1-3.3.
215
Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 205, § 1.02.
216
Actos Settlement, supra note 209, § 1.02.
217
NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 209, § 1.05.
218
Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 208, § I.B.
219
NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 209, § 1.05.

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
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pending the conclusion of the settlement’s mediation
process.220
The attorney recommendation and attorney withdrawal
provisions from Propulsid were also common across the settlements in our database, with some form of recommendation
included in all but the Zimmer Durom Hip Cup and Biomet
settlements, and explicit, mandatory attorney-withdrawal provisions in Vioxx,221 Fosamax,222 and American Medical Systems.223 As in Propulsid, the recommendation and withdrawal
provisions in these three proceedings worked in concert to require an attorney who had a single client who wanted to accept
the settlement offer—whether in the multidistrict proceeding or
state court—to recommend that all of her clients accept the
deal. If a client refused to do so, the attorney had to withdraw
from representing her. Essentially, these provisions tie the attorneys’ desire to be paid for their services to the defendant’s
desire for closure. After Vioxx, commentators frequently discussed and criticized that link,224 which may have prompted
settlement designers in Actos, NuvaRing, and Yasmin/Yaz to
require only that the lead lawyers “use their best efforts to
achieve sufficient participation to meet the participation
benchmarks necessary to effectuate the Program.”225 The Yasmin/Yaz gallbladder settlement, however, contained an additional provision that automatically enrolled the plaintiffs in the
settlement and required them to either affirmatively opt-out of
220
In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414, ¶¶ 1–3
(D.N.J. May 13, 2016) (case management order regarding settlement agreement).
221
Vioxx Settlement, supra note 200, § 1.2.8.1. After some plaintiffs’ attorneys
contended the settlement conflicted with ethical rules, it was reinterpreted to
mean that the attorneys should recommend the deal only if it was in the client’s
best interest. See Alex Berenson, Some Lawyers Seek Changes in Vioxx Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007; see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 Fed.
Appx. 391, 395–97 (5th Cir. July 16, 2010) (affirming district court judge’s handling of non-settling plaintiffs).
222
Fosamax Settlement, supra note 200, ¶¶ 1–2, 5 & Ex. C at C-15 (certification and joinder of counsel, claimant’s counsel). The court subsequently granted
numerous’ attorneys motions to withdraw from representing non-settling claimants. E.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
2014) (order allowing Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor,
P.A. to withdraw as counsel).
223
Even if 95% of the claimants took the offer, the agreement still required
counsel to “employ their best efforts to obtain an executed Release from 100%,”
and if a client refused those overtures, counsel had to withdraw from representing
that client. American Medical Systems Settlement, supra note 207, §§ II.H–I.
224
E.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 266–68 (2011).
225
Each settlement uses this identical language. Yaz Gallbladder Settlement,
supra note 204, § 9.01; Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 205, § 3.01; Actos Settlement, supra note 209, § 5.01; NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 209, § 10.01.

R

R

R
R
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the arrangement (even though it was not a class action) or
submit a claim package before the deadline.226
The two DePuy ASR settlements varied slightly in their
recommendation and withdrawal provisions. Individual signatory attorneys—not just lead lawyers—had to “represent and
warrant that they each will use their best efforts to secure all
documentation required for timely enrollment and compliance
with this Agreement,”227 and, subject to their professional
judgment, “endorse enrollment in the U.S. Program to clients
covered by this Agreement.”228 Instead of requiring plaintiffs’
counsel to withdraw from representing those clients who preferred not to settle, the Special Master could determine that a
law firm or interested counsel “did not act in good faith in
connection with the informed consent process and participation,”229 and DePuy, “at its sole option,” could expel that firm’s
or that attorney’s other clients from the settlement.230
In sum, Figure 8 below illustrates how highly connected
repeat players have replicated and advanced Propulsid’s closure provisions, presumably in response to feedback and deficiencies they perceived in prior settlements. Propulsid may well
have been a tipping point in handling nonclass litigation. But,
because it is the earliest available nonclass settlement in our
data, we cannot be certain. Generally speaking, tipping points
occur when innovations take off in a network, as it seems that
Propulsid’s closure provisions did.231 And it appears that repeat players in our network used their connections to diffuse
and perfect settlement practices originating from Propulsid.232
As such, well-connected attorneys may not only lead litigations, they may also occupy roles as influential opinion leaders;
individuals who are central to a network and rank highly on
betweenness measures can be especially effective at transmitting and diffusing new ideas and practices.233
226
Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 204, § 1.01(A); In re Yasmin and
Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 15, 2013) (case management order no. 60 at 2).
227
2015 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 17.2.8; 2013 DePuy Settlement,
supra note 203, § 17.2.8.
228
2015 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 17.2.8; 2013 DePuy Settlement,
supra note 203, § 17.2.8.
229
2015 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 17.2.12; 2013 DePuy Settlement,
supra note 203, § 17.2.12.
230
2015 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 17.2.12; 2013 DePuy Settlement,
supra note 203, § 17.2.12.
231
See KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 136–43, 187.
232
Diffusion is a familiar concept—most people have caught colds (contagion)
or picked up ideas from others (diffusion). KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 135–36.
233
Id. at 145.

R
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FIGURE 8: THE EVOLUTION OF CLOSURE PROVISIONS STEMMING
FROM PROPULSID
Propulsid

First Generation

Attorney
Recommendation
Provision

Attorney
Withdrawal
Provisions

Defendant
Walkaway
Provision

Second Generation

Mandatory:
Vioxx, Fosamax,
American Med. Sys.

By Plaintiff’s
Attorney:
Vioxx, Fosamax,
American Med. Sys.

Vioxx, Fosamax,
Amerian Med. Sys.,
Yasmin/Yaz,
DePuy ASR, Biomet,
NuvaRing, Actos

Third Generation

“Best efforts:”
Yasmin/Yaz,
DePuy ASR,
NuvaRing, Actos

By Defendant:
DePuy ASR

Case Census:
Yasmin/Yaz,
DePuy ASR,
NuvaRing, Actos,
Zimmer Durom

2. Common-Benefit Fee Awards
One such practice has evolved with regard to enhancing
leaders’ common-benefit fees. Transferee judges often issue an
order at the beginning of litigation that establishes a commonbenefit fund to pay lead lawyers for their fees and costs by
taxing the individual attorneys and their clients a specific percentage of clients’ gross settlement proceeds.234 While judges
have cited various rationales for their authority,235 the orders
essentially create a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, where “leaving it” means referring clients to someone else or, if possible,
filing suit in state court where individual attorneys may nevertheless have to contribute if their clients want to participate in
a global settlement that federal leadership negotiates. While
lead lawyers with clients will have to contribute to the fund too,
their money will eventually transfer from one pocket to the
other at the same rate, unless the judge awards that leader less
of a common-benefit fee. Our analysis of the settlements and
attorneys’ fees found not only that common-benefit fees are
typically awarded, but that they are frequently increased during the litigation when leaders request a judicially awarded
raise, negotiate some aspect of their fees with the defendant
234
See Dubay, supra note 59, at 45–46; William B. Rubenstein, On What a
“Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is Not, and Should Be, CLASS ACTION ATTORNEY’S FEE
DIGEST, Mar. 2009, at 87–89.
235
Burch, supra note 20, at 102–09.

R
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through settlement design, or use some combination of the
two.
TABLE 8: COMMON-BENEFIT FEES

2100

2158

2197
2325

2391

2299

Zimmer Durom Yes
Hip Cup

4%
(2/2)
Federal
plaintiffs
only
DePuy ASR Hip Yes, both 4%
Implant
(3/1)
American
Semi
5%
Medical
Systems
Biomet
Yes
6%
Magnum Hip
(5/1)
Implant
Actos
Yes
None set
(Pioglitazone)

Aspects of
leaders’ fees
negotiated with
defendant

1789
1964

Yes, both 6%
Yes
3%
(2/1)
Fosamax
Yes
9%
NuvaRing
Yes
8%
(5/3)
Yasmin and Yaz Yes, both 6%
(Drospirenone)
(4/2)

Final
percentages of
fees/costs

Propulsid
Vioxx

Common-Benefit Fees
Initial
percentage of
fees and costs

MDL Name

1355
1657

Nonclass
Settlement
Publicly
Available

MDL Number

MDL Information

6%
6.5%

Yes
Yes

9%
15.5% (11/4.5)

Yes
No

11%
(9/2) for ATE;
6%
(4/2) for
gallbladder
4%
(2/2)
State and federal
plaintiffs

Yes

6%
(5/1)
5%

Yes

3.99%

Yes

8.6%

Yes

Yes

Not
available

Midstream fee increases took a variety of forms. In DePuy
ASR, the court initially assessed a 3% common-benefit fee plus
1% for costs.236 But after the plaintiffs’ steering committee
negotiated a settlement that required each plaintiff who settled—whether in federal or state court—to consent to the
transferee court’s fee order, it then requested that the court
236
In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10md-2197 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (case management order no. 13 at 5).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt

unknown

Seq: 67

29-SEP-17

12:56

2017] REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1511
increase fees from 3 to 5%, leaving 1% for costs intact.237 No
one objected, and the court made the change.238 Similarly, in
the Yasmin/Yaz litigation, a request from the lead lawyers increased the assessments from 4 to 9%,239 with the court noting
that no one opposed the motion and that the increase received
“unanimous consent by the PSC.”240 Unlike DePuy and Yaz,
one attorney in the NuvaRing litigation did object to fees, but
only as to his own payout as a steering committee member.241
Yet, the NuvaRing plaintiffs’ steering committee was united in
asking the court to raise its common-benefit assessment from
5% fees and 3% costs to 11% for attorneys’ fees (to be subtracted from primary counsel’s fees) and 4.5% for costs (subtracted from clients’ settlement amount).242
Not only did plaintiffs’ leadership request and receive fee
increases midstream, but in three of the examined settlements
lead lawyers negotiated their payment directly with the defendant. That practice first appeared in the tobacco litigation243
and continues now, appearing in both Propulsid settlements,
and in the Biomet settlement. In the first and second Propulsid
settlements, lead lawyers negotiated a $22.5 million fee244 and
a $4 million fee,245 respectively. The court later authorized
237
2013 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 4.1.8; Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion to Modify the Common Benefit Attorney Fee Hold Back to 5% of
the Gross Recovery Amount at 1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2014).
238
In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2014) (order).
239
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion to Modify Case Management Order
No. 14 at 1–2, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 09-md-2100, (S.D. Ill. Apr., 23, 2014).
240
In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 3:09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. May 16, 2014) (order granting 3315 motion for relief);
In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09md-2100 (S.D. Ill. June 23, 2014) (case management order 63 supplement to case
management order no. 14).
241
Ferrer, Piorot & Wansbrough’s Objections to Special Master’s Recommendation for Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees at 1–3, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 2014).
242
In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009)
(case management order no. 3); Motion to Amend Case Management Order No. 3
at 2–7, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7,
2011); In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2011)
(amended case management order no. 3).
243
See Lester Brickman, Contingency-Fee Con Men, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25,
2007, at A18 (describing how private attorneys “worked out a side deal with the
tobacco industry for the latter to separately pay them fees well in excess of $15
billion”).
244
First Propulsid Settlement, supra note 178, § 19.
245
Second MDL Program Term Sheet § 19, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2005).
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these amounts through its award,246 and then added
$397,860.00 based on the 6% common-benefit fund it installed
at the litigation’s outset.247
Biomet is likewise interesting as it was the only settlement
to feature a choice for those on the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee. Lead lawyers negotiated a $6 million fee directly with the
defendant via a separate agreement—contingent, of course, on
fulfilling the participation percentages necessary to effectuate
the master settlement agreement—as well as a 5% attorneys’
fee assessment (with an additional 1% for costs).248 But the
court’s order required them to accept the lesser of the two—not
both.249 Leaders took the fee they negotiated directly with the
defendant, which was likely far more profitable for them: it
appears that lead lawyers represented the bulk of the clients
(the court needed a new steering committee post-settlement
since most members settled all their clients’ claims),250 so the
defendant may have compensated the steering committee for
work they were already required to perform under their initial
contingent-fee agreement. Put differently, lead lawyers likely
received their full contingent fees plus a $6 million bonus from
defendants.251
Sometimes, even when lead lawyers negotiate aspects of
their fees directly with the defendant, those fees come out of
other plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. By inserting fee provisions into
a master settlement such that claimants (and their counsel)
who want to settle must also “consent” to leadership’s heightened fee, lead attorneys can reach settling state-court plaintiffs
246
In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2012)
(order); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. June 2, 2005)
(order).
247
Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final
Distribution of Remaining Funds at 3–4, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00md-1355 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2014); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md1355 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014) (order).
248
Motion for Payment of Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses from
the Biomet Common Benefit MDL Assessment Fund § 7, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015)
(“Pursuant to a separately negotiated settlement agreement dated January 31,
2014, the Biomet Common Benefit Settlement Agreement (CBSA), Biomet will
deposit an additional $6 million into the Biomet Common Benefit Attorney’s Fee
Fund for the sole purpose of resolving the Common Benefit Attorney Fees associated with this litigation.”).
249
In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. § II.B.2(c), No.
12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2014) (case management order establishing common benefit fee and expense funds § 2(c)).
250
In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2391
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2015) (order).
251
See supra note 248 (noting the $6 million fee).
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who would otherwise fall outside of the transferee judge’s jurisdiction. In Actos and Fosamax, lead lawyers included a provision that subjected all settling plaintiffs—including those
pending in state courts—to the transferee judge’s fee assessment.252 And, in Fosamax, if a lawyer waited until settlement
to agree to the common-benefit tax (as many state-court attorneys would) then the court’s common-benefit fund order increased the assessment from 6 to 9%.253 Lead lawyers in Vioxx
went one step further: they contracted around the court’s 3%
fee cap, raised it to 8%, and deducted the entire amount from
individual attorneys’ contingent fees.254 Yet, unlike many of
the cases examined, the carte blanche revision incited numerous objections.255 Accordingly, the judge appointed a liaison
counsel, who oversaw status conferences, discovery, briefing,
and arguments; eventually lead lawyers agreed to reduce their
fee request to 7.5%.256 Nevertheless, the judge reduced the
award to 6.5%, or $315,250,000 in fees—still a notable difference from the initial 3%.257
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup was notable for initially deviating
from this pattern, but then following it. The judge’s original
common-benefit order included a 4% fee, permitted the court to
adjust that percentage based on factors in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, and expressly struck language that
taxed state-court litigants.258 After the court repeatedly reduced common-benefit holdbacks in individual cases,259 the
lead lawyers asked for a new order applying the holdback to all
state-court plaintiffs who benefitted from their efforts.260 Citing both a lack of jurisdiction for doing so and noting that
252
Actos Settlement, supra note 209, § 10.04; Fosamax Settlement, supra note
201, ¶ 14.
253
In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-md-1789, §§ 3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
2010) (case management order no. 17).
254
Vioxx Settlement, supra note 200, § 9.2.1.
255
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646–47 (E.D. La. 2010);
Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2001–02 (2011).
256
Vioxx, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 646–47.
257
Id. at 655, 658.
258
Case Management Order No. 3: Order Establishing Common Benefit Fund,
¶¶ 3, 11, In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J.
Jan. 21, 2011).
259
E.g., In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414
(D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011) (order reducing common-benefit contribution to 1%); In re
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J. June 8,
2011) (same).
260
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify Case Management Order No. 3 to Provide for
Contribution to the Common Benefit Fund by State-Court Plaintiffs, In re Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2015).
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leaders had not conferred benefits on the state plaintiffs, the
court refused.261 Nevertheless, when leaders negotiated a
master settlement, they included a provision that unilaterally
taxed all settling plaintiffs 4%.262 The court then ordered all
multidistrict plaintiffs to participate in the settlement, comply
with its deadlines, or face dismissal.263 Because the settlement
required all participating lawyers to register all their cases (filed
or unfiled, in state or federal court),264 lead lawyers effectively
used their bargaining authority with the defendant to expand
the federal court’s jurisdiction and their fee base.
Additionally, we observed a common practice of scaling up
fee assessments based on how quickly individual counsel assented to common-benefit fees. The Fosamax fee request and
order, for example, offered 3% fees and 3% costs for those who
consented (whether in federal or state court) to the assessment
agreement within 90 days, but increased the price to 5% fees
and 3% costs for latecomers; if an attorney waited to see
whether the lead lawyers actually negotiated a beneficial deal
for their clients, then fees and costs increased to 6 and 5,
respectively.265 Likewise, the Yasmin/Yaz litigation assessed
6% initially, and 10% for latecomers.266 Plainly, the point is to
incentivize early buy-in from the individual attorneys whose
contingency fees will be reduced even though the increase may
not align with quantum-meruit principles.267
3. Latecomer Reductions and Reversion Clauses
Finally, we observed two provisions that, while not as common as others, warrant increased scrutiny—latecomer reductions and reversion provisions. Settlement designers in DePuy
ASR and Zimmer Durom Hip Cup experimented with a unique
clause that reduced payouts to claimants who were not repre261
In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J.
Apr. 30, 2015) (order on motion to modify CMO No. 3).
262
Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 208, § V.C.
263
In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414, ¶ 2
(D.N.J. May 13, 2016) (case management order regarding settlement agreement).
264
Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 208, § I.B.
265
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Memorandum of Authorities in Support of
Motion for Creation of a Common Benefit Fund at 11, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (requesting a 10% total assessment for those who waited until settlement); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010) (case management order no. 17 at 3–4).
266
In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 09-md-2100, §§ 3–4 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2010) (case management order
no. 14 (establishing common benefit fee and expense fund) at 3–4).
267
Burch, supra note 20, at 128–35.
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sented by counsel as of a certain date.268 The idea was to
thwart the Field-of-Dreams problem for the defendant: creating
a claims process can encourage attorneys and plaintiffs (often
with weaker claims) to emerge at the last minute, file suit, and
partake of the settlement.
To discourage this, latecomer provisions immediately reduced unrepresented claimants’ awards by 29% and covered
two groups of people: (1) those litigating pro se, and (2) those
who retained attorneys and filed suit after the identified date.
As to the former, DePuy ASR designers claimed that the reduction simply discounted pro se litigants’ payout to the same
amount they would have received if they had to pay attorneys’
fees, but noted, “there will be an additional Court approved
deduction for common benefit fees and expenses.”269 The second group with counsel is even worse off, for they began with
29% less than those who retained counsel before the date and
will then have to pay their primary counsel’s fees and commonbenefit fees out of that reduced award.270 These latecomer provisions help defendants by encouraging attorneys to file all of
their pending cases immediately and by discouraging further
attorney advertising. Plus, the provisions are mostly costless
for lead lawyers who have advanced notice of the provision, can
file all of their claims, and, in DePuy ASR’s case, still receive
latecomers’ common-benefit fees.
In addition to the latecomer reductions, both DePuy ASR
settlements contained reversion clauses: the 29% taken off the
top of unrepresented plaintiffs’ claims reverted to DePuy, the
defendant.271 Propulsid made even greater use of reversion
clauses, initially reverting $40 million of an $87 million fund to
defendant Johnson & Johnson,272 then $5 million of the sec-

268
2013 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 4.4; 2015 DePuy Settlement,
supra note 203, § 4.4; Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 208, § II.A.2.e.
269
ASR Settlement – Benefits Overview at 4, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.
ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/5FXT-ZZDH]; see also Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra
note 208, § V.C. (reducing common-benefit fees for unrepresented claimants to
2%).
270
For an ethical analysis of this practice, see Burch, Monopolies, supra note
71, at 104–07.
271
2013 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, §§ 7.1.3.1, 7.1.7; 2015 DePuy
Settlement, supra note 203, §§ 7.1.3.1, 7.1.7.
272
Joint Motion and Order for Partial Disbursement of Settlement Funds to
Defendant Johnson & Johnson, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2011); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355
(E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011) (order).
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ond $15 million fund,273 and finally the remaining balance of
all settlement and administrative funds.274 In class actions,
reversion clauses have triggered additional scrutiny to determine whether the settlement’s terms were detrimental to the
class.275 Absent the class device, courts lack the formal authority to oversee aggregate settlements, though they retain the
power to award common-benefit fees under quantum-meruit
principles.276
IV
IMPLICATIONS
Nonclass aggregation has long fostered an uneasy union
between the individual and the collective. This tension plays
out among scholars, as they consistently prioritize one over the
other: some want to use aggregation procedures to regulate
conduct efficiently and deter wrongdoing in order to maximize
social welfare, while others privilege individual autonomy and
consent over the general welfare, aiming to afford individual
justice to victims through their own day in court.277 While
273
In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011)
(order).
274
In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2012)
(order terminating the claims of all enrollees in the second MDL resolution program and authorizing return to the defendants the balance of the settlement fund
and administrative fund after all payments due thereunder have been made).
275
Int’l Precious Metals Corp. v. Walters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1223 (2000)
(O’Connor, J., statement respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari); In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947–48 (9th Cir.
2011).
276
Burch, supra note 20, at 116–18, 128–38.
277
For examples of those who tend to emphasize individual autonomy, see
Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation, 10 J. L. & COM. 1,
32–33 (1990); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573,
1573–75 (2007). Echoes of autonomy exist in Supreme Court opinions as well.
E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (discussing the idea of one’s own day in court). For examples
of those adopting a collective or efficiency-based approach, see Bruce L. Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 479, 479–84 (1997); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing
Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 561–68 (1987); David
Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 210–16 (1996). Still others have recommendations for mitigating between these two camps to protect both individual and group
interests. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking
Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26–32 (1996); Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do
That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 858–59 (1994);
Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821,
1821–22 (1995); Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 918, 918–22 (1995). Some of these demarcations come from David L.
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social networks do not ease this fundamental tension, they do
allow us to consider both individuals and groups—to understand how interconnections and interactions among people
and events affect attorneys’ fees and claims resolution, and
how those fees and results may impact individuals’ perceptions
about the justice system.
Mapping the network of attorneys and proceedings and
then analyzing the deals that repeat players design provides us
with some insight into the flow of information between connected repeat players, the replication and refinement of practices, and how well-connected leaders might use their
positional influence within the network to create, disseminate,
and perpetuate norms and practices that benefit their working
relationships. As past work considered how these cases compared with non-aggregated litigation and how they proceeded
through federal courts,278 the next logical step was to examine
who shepherded these cases through the legal system and how
they resolved them without Rule 23’s protections. Accordingly,
this Article considered who the repeat lawyers are in a sample
of products-liability and sales-practices proceedings, the connections between them, the nonclass settlements they designed, and the common-benefit fees they received.
Consistent with past findings, repeat players do exist, and
they serve in leadership positions that allow them to negotiate
master settlements. As we elaborate in this Part, those positions likewise afford them influence. And their connectedness
in the network may allow them to diffuse, adapt, and replicate
practices that benefitted them financially.279 Consequently,
Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913,
914–16 n.3–4 (1998).
278
Catherine R. Borden, Emery G. Lee III & Margaret S. Williams, Centripetal
Forces: Multidistrict Litigation and Its Parts, 75 LA. L. REV. 425, 425–27 (2014).
279
For example, Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies appointed an editorial
board of six attorneys to create a “MDL Standards and Best Practices” guide.
Each board member is a high-level repeat player. Chilton Varner, of King &
Spalding, is a defense attorney who litigated Fosamax and Paxil. John Beisner, of
Skadden Arps, is a defense attorney who litigated Vioxx and DePuy ASR and his
law firm appeared seven times on the defense side in the data. Elizabeth
Cabraser, of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, is a plaintiffs’ attorney who was
appointed as a lead lawyer six times and lawyers for her firm were appointed a
total of seventeen times. Christopher Seeger, of Seeger Weiss LLP, is a plaintiffs’
attorneys who was appointed as a lead lawyer fourteen times in the data and
lawyers from his firm were appointed a total of twenty times. Ted Mayer, of
Hughes Hubbard & Reed, is a defense attorney who litigated Fosamax and Vioxx.
Daniel Girard, of Girard Gibbs, did not appear in the data since the focus was on
products-liability cases and he specializes in securities suits, but his law firm
appeared on the defense team of seven product-liability cases. See also Tables
3–4, A2–A3, supra at 34–36, infra at 72–74 (listing repeat players).
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this Part begins by discussing our findings on repeat players’
impact, then postulates that these repetitive interactions could
add to classic principal-agent problems by desensitizing lawyers to behavior that benefits counsel more than clients. We
then situate multidistrict litigation within the rich literature on
other complex adaptive systems and use those core insights to
suggest that future reformers would do well to consider how
network connectivity affects their efforts to provoke systemic
change.
A. Repeat Players’ Impact
To begin to gauge repeat players’ impact, we obtained and
analyzed the thirteen publicly available, private nonclass settlements that occurred in ten multidistrict litigations within
our dataset, which collectively covered 64,107 actions. In examining those settlements, we looked for four types of provisions: (1) those that generate closure (attorneyrecommendation, attorney-withdrawal, walkaway, and casecensus provisions); (2) those where lead lawyers negotiate some
aspect of their fees with a defendant either directly or through
the settlement; (3) those that reduced awards to latecomers;
and (4) those that allowed the money remaining in the settlement fund to revert to defendants. Closure, latecomer, and
reversion provisions benefit defendants, while common-benefit
fee provisions reward lead plaintiffs’ lawyers. When courts and
the parties made the claims-filing data public, which was rare,
we considered that information as well.280
As evidenced previously in Table 6, we found that at least
one of our top five repeat players (based on degree centrality)
participated directly in each settled litigation’s leadership. The
Propulsid settlement designers noted they were creating a template for settlement, and they were correct. Every nonclass
settlement in our database after it contained some of its features and at least one closure-related provision to help end the
lawsuits.

280
For an overview of what little information was available, see Burch, Monopolies, supra note 71, at 131–32, Table 3.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt

unknown

Seq: 75

29-SEP-17

12:56

2017] REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1519
FIGURE 9: SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS IN THE THIRTEEN
EXAMINED SETTLEMENTS

Each settlement uniformly departed from conventional
deals between plaintiffs and defendants, shifting the deal-making entities to lead lawyers and defendants, and then requiring
individual attorneys to either become additional signatories or
recommend the deal to all of their clients if one client wanted to
settle. Additionally, as Figure 9 illustrates, every settlement
permitted the defendant to walk away from its funding obligations if too few claimants abandoned their right to sue in the
judicial system in favor of the settlement’s claims-administration process. Combined, these changes tied plaintiffs’ attorneys’ financial self-interest to each other, for none of them
would receive fees if too few claimants accepted the settlement
offer. Also like Propulsid, two settlements took the added step
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of explicitly requiring attorneys to withdraw from representing
clients who refused to settle.
Common-benefit fee and settlement-fund distribution
practices were remarkably similar, with plaintiffs’ leadership
often negotiating a fee increase for themselves at the end of a
proceeding. Moreover, in two of the eleven litigations, Propulsid
and Biomet, lead lawyers negotiated their fees directly with the
defendant, such that the fees were not apportioned from the
common fund (in accordance with a restitution theory),281 but
from the defendant’s coffers. In six other litigations—Vioxx,
Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy ASR, Fosamax, Actos, and Zimmer Durom
Hip Cup—lead lawyers included some aspect of their commonbenefit fee within the settlement, which meant negotiating their
compensation with the defendant. Bargaining over attorneys’
fees with one’s opponent—even if subject to court approval—is
a unilateral move away from contingent fees, which are designed to tie the fates of lawyer and client by increasing fees in
proportion with a client’s actual recovery.
Finally, both DePuy ASR settlements and the Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup settlement contained latecomer reductions,
which help defendants by discouraging attorney advertising
and reducing payouts. And two litigations (each producing two
settlements)—Propulsid and DePuy ASR—included provisions
in which all or part of the remaining settlement funds reverted
to the defendants. In DePuy ASR, the reversion clause worked
in concert with the settlement’s practice of reducing payouts to
latecomers since those funds reverted to the defendant.
In sum, we found robust empirical evidence of repeatplayer attorneys on both the plaintiff and defense side as well
as a multidistrict-litigation leadership network that contains a
strong, cohesive center. The lack of formal rules in multidistrict proceedings allows these repeat players to shape the
methods for selecting and compensating leadership, and the
lack of formal judicial oversight in nonclass settlements affords
repeat players considerable latitude in settlement design.
Based on the limited nonclass settlements available to us,
we found reason to be concerned that when repeat players
influence the practices and norms that govern multidistrict
proceedings—when they “play for rules,” so to speak—the
practices they develop, cite, and replicate may principally benefit them at one-shot plaintiffs’ expense. While we were often
281
Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 663–66 (1991).
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unable to obtain claims-rate or payout information that was
filed under seal or kept private, many of the settlement provisions appear to enrich lead plaintiffs’ lawyers and the defendants with whom they broker the deal—not one-shot
plaintiffs.282 If claims-administration data were available, it
could provide a more complete and robust picture of the benefit
these practices confer on claimants.
Given the data available to us, however, over a twenty-twoyear span, we were unable to find any publicly available nonclass settlement that did not feature at least one closure provision (which benefits the defendant). And, excepting NuvaRing,
where the transferee court taxed settling state-court plaintiffs
directly,283 and American Medical Systems, where fees were not
available, each settlement likewise contained some provision
that increased lead lawyers’ fees. While one could argue that
we cannot claim causation with such evidence (and to be fair,
we are not trying to do so), the mere fact that the same players appear in the vast majority of these cases, resulting in
remarkably similar settlements that benefit the people designing them merits concern and warrants further empirical
investigation.284
B. Implications for Leverage, Ethics, and Collusion
A highly concentrated plaintiff and defense bar is nothing
new, nor is the disquiet about where that concentration may
lead. As scholars have long recognized, repeat play tends to
regress our adversarial system from its confrontational roots
toward a state of cooperation.285 In the criminal context, prosecutors and public defenders routinely work together through
plea bargaining, leading them toward mutual accommodation;
incumbents form a primary community of interest, whereas
282
Anecdotal evidence is rife with mistrust of the deals these lawyers create.
See, e.g., Barry Meier, Frustration from a Deal on Flawed Hip Implants, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2013, at B1 (“But some patients contend that the deal’s real winners are
Johnson & Johnson and the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Those lawyers are set to receive
about one-third of the settlement, or about $800 million. The single biggest
chunk of those fees will go to the firms most involved with developing cases
against Johnson & Johnson and negotiating the settlement; they will get a bonus
of about $160 million.”).
283
Common Benefit Order at 3–4, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2011).
284
See Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System,
11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 53 (1967) (“[A]s in all institutions based on conflict,
there is a perception of ‘deviance’ when actors who are supposed to be genuinely
antagonistic begin to cooperate.”).
285
Id. at 68–69.
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clients present secondary challenges and contingencies.286 As
such, adversary features are often overshadowed by regulars’
quid pro quo needs.287 As Professor Jerome Skolnick has explained, those working group relationships become a social
control problem only once they reach a “tipping point where
cooperation may shade off into collusion, thereby subverting
the ethical basis of the system.”288
In 1995, Professor John Coffee lamented in the class context, “[t]hese circumstances supply the preconditions for collusion between defendants and a favored plaintiffs’ counsel:
repeat players, a single forum in which the court is eager to
achieve a global settlement, and ‘passive’ future claimants.”289
He went on to distinguish between “old” collusion, where there
is an actual or implicit agreement in which defendants settle
cheaply in exchange for higher plaintiffs’ attorneys fees,290 and
“new” collusion through inventory settlements as side deals to
a settlement class, double-dipping by serving as both class
counsel and individual counsel for opt-outs, and striking deals
that restrict claimants’ eligibility through rigorous claims criteria.291 Some of these scenarios resonate with the settlements
examined, such as Propulsid’s claims process, reversion
clauses, and direct fee negotiation; Biomet’s direct fee agreement with the defendant and potentially doubled attorneys’
fees; DePuy ASR’s reversion clause; and both DePuy ASR and
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup’s reductions for nonclient, unrepresented plaintiffs, which are similar to paying one’s inventory
clients more than class members—a practice the Supreme
Court struck down in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor and
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.292
Of course, there are some important distinctions between
class and nonclass aggregation: nonclass aggregation cannot
bind those not before the court as a class action can. Because
plaintiffs are present and have filed suit, conventional thinking
suggests that plaintiffs’ consent to settle is enough; there is no
need to layer in judicial supervision as there is when absent
286
Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15, 20–21, 24 (1967).
287
Id. at 24.
288
Skolnick, supra note 284, at 69.
289
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1366–67 (1995).
290
Id. at 1367.
291
Id. at 1373–78.
292
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599 (1997); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 854 (1999).
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class members’ rights are at stake. But our findings suggest
that attorneys’ financial interests may muddy plaintiffs’ consent since clients typically follow their attorney’s advice.293
Lawyers’ finances may be intertwined with each other not only
through settlement provisions that condition the deal (and attorneys’ fees) on achieving a certain plaintiff participation rate,
but also through formal joint venture agreements and informal
promises to distribute common-benefit work and leadership
positions to allies. Longstanding principal-agent research suggests that agents’ financial self-interest may color their advice
to clients.294 Just as they do in the class action and criminal
context, repeat players face systemic temptations to be more
loyal to each other or even to defendants, than to their own
clients.295
Individual plaintiffs’ attorneys’ lack of litigation leverage
and power may compound these temptations. Ordinarily, even
an out-gunned and out-manned plaintiffs’ lawyer squaring off
against a well-heeled defendant can threaten to take a case to
trial on a shoestring budget. But multidistrict litigation takes
away that bargaining chip for all but a handful of bellwether
cases; transferee judges rarely remand cases for trial.296 When
combined with plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interlaced financial interests and a tightly connected social network, that lack of leverage against defendants turns into a lack of power for individual
attorneys who might otherwise act as a check on questionable
settlement practices.
Repeat players’ relationships with one another may likewise play a critical role in creating social norms and perpetuating practices that push ethical boundaries. Regular interaction
could lead plaintiffs’ attorneys to have stronger social and relational ties to each other than to one-time clients, and could
prompt them to identify as a group.297 Groups tend to catalyze
293
See Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers
Have Their Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes
Toward Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 277, 285 (2007); Gordon,
supra note 32, at 30; Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 32, at 82; Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 269, 291–97, 318–19 (1999).
294
John C. Coffee, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 331, 340–41 (2000); Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass
Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 302 (2003).
295
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
296
Burch, supra note 58, at 410–20.
297
See ELLICKSON, supra note 66, at 177–78 (“A group is close-knit when
informal power is broadly distributed among group members and the information
pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them.”); Blumberg, supra
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when people work toward a common goal like prevailing
against a particular defendant, share physical and social immediacy as leaders must when working together, and have
overlapping common norms such as those inherent in championing citizens’ rights.298 Once a group forms, research
shows that members exhibit other-regarding preferences—
trust, reciprocity, and altruism—toward other members.299
Enduring groups comprised of long-term friends, colleagues,
and business associates tend to cooperate to achieve the best
collective outcome for the group.300 And studies demonstrate
that their fairness considerations can change based on
whether the situation involves another group member (inclusionary concerns for other repeat actors, perhaps) or individuals outside the group (exclusionary concerns for one-time
clients).301
Should members observe other members at the top of the
social hierarchy (perhaps those who rank highly in degree centrality) acting unethically, then that behavior may become the
descriptive norm.302 When the lines between ethical and unethical behavior are blurred, as they are in an aggregate litigation system founded on an individual dispute resolution
model,303 people tend to categorize their actions positively so as
to avoid impacting their own self-image.304 If group members
embrace higher levels of unethical behavior, then that behavior
note 286, at 24; Daniel J. Brass et al., Relationships and Unethical Behavior: A
Social Network Perspective, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 14, 17 (1998).
298
See Albert A. Cota et al., The Structure of Group Cohesion, 21 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 572, 574, 577 (1995); R. Scott Tindale et al., Shared Cognition
in Small Groups, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES
1, 5 (Michael A. Hoagg & R. Scott Tindale, eds., 2001).
299
See Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let’s Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374–75 (2006) (reviewing the
literature on other-regarding preferences).
300
See ELLICKSON, supra note 66, at 167 (“[M]embers of a close-knit group
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate
welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.”); Leigh
Thompson et al., Cohesion and Respect: An Examination of Group Decision Making
in Social and Escalation Dilemmas, 34 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 289, 291–92
(1998).
301
Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Intrinsic Versus Community-Based Justice
Models: When Does Group Membership Matter?, 46 J. SOC. ISSUES 83, 84–86
(1990).
302
Gina et al., supra note 24, at 394, 396, 398.
303
Baker, supra note 23, at 298–304.
304
See M.E. Schwitzer & C.K. Hsee, Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification
and Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
185, 185–86 (2002).
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can turn into an accepted practice.305 Put simply, unethical
behavior, particularly among in-group members, can be
contagious.306
In-groups comprised of highly connected actors likewise
tend to police themselves internally through social and financial sanctions.307 As the social network illustrates, repeat
players form dyadic relationships to others, which not only
allows knowledge of common settlement practices to flow freely
among them, but also information about cooperative and uncooperative behaviors, and attorneys’ reputations as collaborators, contrarians, or defectors. The easy flow of information
may enable leaders to credibly punish and reward others for
following or disregarding norms, which decreases the likelihood that information about tacit or explicit collusion would
surface or that members would raise ethical concerns about
settlement practices on their client’s behalf.308 Our anecdotal
evidence bears this out. In-group attorneys spoke with us
freely only on the condition of anonymity, for defecting in one
proceeding could prompt financial repercussions in concurrent
and future proceedings. After all, when judges defer to attorneys to pick their own leaders through the consensus method
and appoint lead lawyers to serve on fee-allocation committees,
they can give repeat players substantial enforcement tools.
This leaves us with a new variant on the timeless principalagent concern that, without monitoring, agents may disserve
their principals to benefit themselves: lead lawyers as agents
may disserve out-group principals with whom they seldom interact to immediately benefit lead lawyers’ collective interests

305
See Gina et al., supra note 24, at 393–94; see also Fehr & Fischbacher,
supra note 24, at 186–87 (discussing the relationship between social norms and
punishment).
306
See Gina et al., supra note 24, at 398.
307
E.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 66, at 208–10, 225–29, 230–33.
308
See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 18, at 160–61 (noting how networks
among boards of directors allow for collusion and market manipulation); Fehr &
Fischbacher, supra note 24, at 187–88 (2004) (observing that where opportunities
to punish exist, “cooperation flourishes” and that punishment might occur “because [the subjects] view unilateral defection as an unfair act that violates the
conditional cooperation norm and thus deserves retaliation”); Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 159, 168–70 (2000) (finding that in situations with incomplete contracts—like those for distributing common-benefit work and common-benefit
funds among multidistrict litigation attorneys—the power to behave reciprocally
by rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors substantially contributes to
contract enforcement).
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and to better their own, individual interests over time.309 Attorneys on the social network’s periphery might further their
own interests by cooperating with questionable practices; this
could earn them trust from the current group leaders and position them for future leadership roles as well as the lucrative
common-benefit fees that accompany them. It likewise adds
insight into the path dependencies that led to Professor Coffee’s
conclusion that “[o]nce bent, legal rules tend to stay bent.”310
Questionable practices may be entrenched and replicated not
only because they benefit repeat actors, but because they
might be woven into the legal, social, and ethical culture.
C. Implications for Law Reform
Stepping back and looking more broadly at the social network suggests that the behaviors of controlling stakeholders—
plaintiffs’ attorneys, defense attorneys, defendants, and even
judges—cannot be understood in isolation. As social norms so
aptly illustrate, each agent adjusts to feedback from a variety of
sources and circumstances such as Rule 23’s absence, judicial
selection criteria, agents’ needs, parties’ desires, ethical cultures, legislation, and of course the underlying facts and law.
Agents adapt.311 As the evolution of Propulsid’s settlement provisions demonstrate, new practices emerge from past successes and failures. Dissecting the discrete settlements that
repeat actors design and viewing them in the aggregate allows
us to identify emergent properties and trends.312
Understanding how these agents interact, change, and acclimate—what, in other words, makes multidistrict litigation
complex—can help us formulate more realistic and useful propositions about how we might improve the system. Of course,
some existing theories already explain basic interactions. For
instance, the prisoner’s dilemma—where players decide
whether to cooperate with one another by staying silent or to
defect by giving the other player up in return for a shorter
sentence—helps us understand bilateral, strategic interactions
309
See Blumberg, supra note 286, at 24 (“Close and continuing relations
between the lawyer ‘regular’ and his former colleagues in the prosecutor’s office
generally overshadow the relationship between the regular and his client.”).
310
Coffee, supra note 289, at 1463.
311
MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 50, 53, 178–81.
312
See id. at 46 (discussing theories of emergence); Tom De Wolf & Tom
Holvoet, Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising
When Combined, in ENGINEERING SELF-ORGANISING SYSTEMS: METHODOLOGIES AND
APPLICATIONS 1, 3 (Sven A. Brueckner et al. eds., 2005).
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without much complexity.313 Likewise, tit-for-tat strategies in
repeated situations—where players cooperate upon first interacting with someone, but retaliate when cooperation is not reciprocated—can help us understand how interconnected
repeat players may profit more financially over time by working
together than objecting to questionable practices.314 It can
also shed light on why a one-shotter attorney may be better off
defecting (by objecting when excluded from leadership or not
cooperating when the usual practices diverge from her client’s
best interest, for example) unless she hopes to become a repeat
player.315
But these traditional analytic tools tend to break down
when many people interact—multiple claimants, attorneys, defendants, judges, rules committees, and legislatures.316 It is
the difference between tic-tac-toe and chess.317 Unlike conventional tools, complex adaptive systems theory, the theory that
underpins social network analysis, allows us to consider
agents’ interconnectivity.
Characterizing multidistrict litigation as a complex adaptive system alongside things like cities, stock markets, and
grasslands provides a way to explore the complexity and adaptivity inherent in those proceedings.318 Across the board, these
systems share characteristics that are not perfectly patterned,
completely random, or entirely chaotic. Instead, they include
sophisticated agents who evolve to capitalize on changing circumstances, and act strategically in ways that are sometimes
rational and sometimes not.319 Like other complex adaptive
systems, multidistrict proceedings include diverse, connected,
interdependent, networked agents that interact repeatedly and
313
M.A. Nowak & R.M. May, Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos, 359
NATURE 826, 826 (1992); M.A. Nowak, & R.M. May, The Spatial Dilemmas of
Evolution, 3 INT’L J. BIFURCATION & CHAOS 1, 35–36 (1993).
314
See generally R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION CORPORATION (1984); Fehr &
Fischbacher, supra note 24, at 186.
315
E.g., Alison Frankel, Lance Cooper Lost Big in Attack on GM Lead Counsel—
but Did MDL Process Win?, REUTERS, Feb. 11, 2016 (discussing non-repeat player
Lance Cooper’s objections to lead lawyers’ conduct in litigation against General
Motors); Barry Meier, Lawyer for Plaintiffs Suing G.M. Steps Up Criticism of Another, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2016, at B4 (same).
316
See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 221.
317
See id. at 220.
318
No single definition exists, but a good working definition is as follows: “the
study of systems comprised of a macroscopic, heterogeneous set of autonomous
agents interacting and adapting in response to one another and to external environment inputs.” J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. L. REV. 885,
893 (2008).
319
See SCOTT E. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY 7–8 (2011).
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generate adaptive outcomes that cannot be isolated into their
component parts.320 The patterns that emerge are neither
completely ordered nor totally arbitrary. Plaintiffs’ lawyers do
not randomly pair with one another to form coalitions (as models for considering the spread of disease often assume), nor
does everyone within the plaintiffs’ bar interact simultaneously
with everyone else (like political models often suppose).
Complexity arises when agents like repeat players depend
on each other and that dependence spurs system-wide effects.321 Take grasslands, for example. The species in that
environment interact in many different ways, which builds network connectivity. Substituting one agent, say a “sit-and-wait”
spider (or an experienced but less centrally networked attorney) with an “active hunting” spider (a central repeat player)
can set off a chain reaction: to avoid becoming the active spider’s prey, grasshoppers change their feeding strategy, which
likewise alters vegetation.322 Agents adapt through feedback
and produce effects beyond their bilateral interactions. Once
active hunting spiders infiltrate an area as repeat players have
done in multidistrict leadership, they may create a pattern that
makes inroads by sit-and-wait spiders increasingly difficult,
thereby establishing “path dependence.”323
Path dependence isn’t limited to grasslands and spiders.
When Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA), for example, it aimed to reform and dislodge classaction lawyers—Milberg Weiss, in particular—by creating a
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is the one with
the largest financial interest.324 Congress’s hope was that this
would instill a sophisticated, incentivized entity to monitor
plaintiffs’ lawyers. But rather than displacing large plaintiffs’
firms, the PSLRA entrenched them;325 one study published
eight years after PSLRA’s enactment showed Milberg Weiss as
lead or co-lead counsel in over 50% of the cases.326 Why? To
gain institutional clients with the biggest stakes, the plaintiffs’
320
See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 221; PAGE, supra note 319, at 7–8, 38;
Ruhl, supra note 318, at 889.
321
See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 9.
322
Ruhl, supra note 318, at 887.
323
Id. at 894.
324
S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6, n.8 (1995) (citing William P. Barrett, I Have No
Clients, FORBES 52 (Oct. 11, 1993) (quoting William Lerach)).
325
Tamara Loomis, Milberg Weiss Stronger than Ever Despite Reform Act, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 25, 2003, at 4.
326
LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM
ACT SECURITIES LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2003, at 14
(2003).
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bar had to spend significant resources to advertise, effectively
boxing smaller firms out of the market.327 In short, the PSLRA
actually benefitted larger, moneyed plaintiffs’ firms like Milberg
Weiss, created a concentrated bar, and established path
dependence.
Likewise, when transferee judges use experience, cooperative tendencies, and an ability to finance the litigation as primary factors in selecting lead lawyers in multidistrict litigation,
they entrench repeat players in leadership roles. But path dependence is not path permanence. Just as the active hunting
spider might be “locked in” for now, another key feature of the
complex adaptive system is “stable disequilibrium.”328 Change
can constantly occur. If sit-and-wait spiders are less susceptible to harsh winters than the active hunting spider, then a
particularly cold winter might prompt conditions ripe for
change.329 Similarly, if non-repeat players faithfully defend
their clients’ best interests against their own self-interest and
the self-interest of lead lawyers, then ethical clarifications and
external measures that promote competition might provoke
change, too. External adjustments such as the passage of the
Class Action Fairness Act can upset the balance in complex
litigation as well.330 Nevertheless, because of agents’ adaptivity, most change is incremental—not dramatic; entrenched
agents are resilient, as the PSLRA example illustrates.
What then can we learn from situating multidistrict litigation as a complex adaptive system? First, drawing from its rich
interdisciplinary literature, its core ideas, and its metaphors
allows us make more realistic assumptions about the social
activity, information, and behaviors that are likely to occur
within multidistrict litigation’s social network.331 There are
certain patterns that emerge and hold true across all complex
adaptive systems—ecosystems, political elections, and economies, for instance. Here are two: (1) diversity typically enhances complex systems’ functionality and contributes to
innovation and productivity; and (2) complex systems need
327
See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1593, 1604–05 (2008).
328
Ruhl, supra note 318, at 895.
329
Id.
330
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat.
4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Erichson, supra note 327, at
1604–05.
331
See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 230 (observing that “there are deep
commonalities—ones that do not respect the usual academic boundaries—across
the various systems we observe in the world”).
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competition to flourish and diversity drives competition.332
When the same actors work together repeatedly, their thinking
tends to converge, and emphasizing cooperation can dampen
competition that might otherwise serve to safeguard plaintiffs’
best interests.333
Second, using social network analysis to map connections
between agents in multidistrict litigation reveals links that cannot be seen by the naked eye. Those connections allow us to
develop some working hypotheses about the level of repeat play
and the kind of social interactions that might occur when
agents encounter one another in well-defined networks. Consider three such possibilities. First, when attorneys become
lead lawyers, they and their allies have the power to distribute
common-benefit work, suggest fee allocations, and report uncooperative behavior to the judge—carrots and sticks, in other
words.334 Second, judicial focus on experience, financial resources, and cooperation means that lead attorneys not only
possess power in the current litigation, but will almost always
have concurrent and future leadership opportunities to credibly punish or reward other attorneys. Finally, unlike gametheoretic computer exercises, repeat players likely have inside
information about past behaviors and transactions through direct knowledge, gossip, and news reports. In short, reciprocity
and reputation may prove integral to this close-knit group of
lawyers: they may share information easily through their network, exercise power in future litigations, and credibly sanction and reward one another for following or disregarding
norms that promote their collective interests.
Third, from there we can diagnose probable systemic dysfunctions. Multidistrict litigation is designed to promote pre332

See PAGE, supra note 319, at 8–9, 215–17.
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY GROUPS GO TO EXTREMES (2008) (contending that deliberation among groups with diverse opinions prevents extremism); SUNSTEIN, supra note 120, at 145–47 (arguing that checks and balances in
partisan politics constrains group polarization and extreme movements). Unlike
group polarization and groupthink, confirmation bias is an individual bias that
can be exacerbated or mollified by group decision-making. See Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41, 52–53 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986); Stefan Schulz-Hardt
et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 656–58 (2000).
334
Judges often appoint lead lawyers to fee allocation committees and solicit
input on how to distribute attorneys’ fees. Dubay, supra note 59, at 55–56, Tbl.
13.; see, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. June 13,
2012) (order appointing lead lawyers to fee allocation committee). Power need not
be equal among members; they must simply have enough authority to credibly
threaten to punish defectors. ELLICKSON, supra note 66, at 178–79.
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trial efficiency and consistency without altering core due
process rights such as adequate representation and the right to
have one’s day in court. But settlements with provisions that
principally benefit the attorneys or the defendant at the plaintiffs’ expense might indicate that efficiency has trumped adequate representation.335 Recalibration may be in order.
Fourth, we can recognize the limited capacity to dramatically change the status quo and instead propose malleable
methods that work with—not against—the inertia of a complex
adaptive system. While federal rules committees and legislatures may seek changes that provoke paradigm shifts,336 the
reality is that attorneys in this elite bar are adaptive, resilient,
and likely to withstand these adjustments. Thus, the broader
lesson is that enhancing functionality within multidistrict litigation may not hinge on top-down or external legislative reforms, but in harnessing an equally adaptive power that
already lies within the system itself: competition.337 As the
vast literature on collateral attacks in the class-action context
illustrates, the plaintiffs’ bar is highly competitive.338 But judicial selection methods and deference to repeat players may
have muted open rivalry by encouraging and rewarding cooperation. Interconnected agents who benefit from the status quo
are more likely to shun and ostracize objectors who threaten to
disrupt their practices—particularly if that objection could derail a lucrative settlement. Consequently, the question going
forward becomes how to tweak norms and design adjustments
that capitalize on pre-existing competitive forces such that
faithfully representing plaintiffs’ interests becomes more lucrative than playing the long game.339

335
For an argument as to why Due Process protections of adequate representation should extend to nonclass multidistrict litigation in ways that are similar to
class actions, see Burch, supra note 71, at 158–61, 179.
336
E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Washington D.C., Apr. 9–10, 2015, at 39–41, available at http://www
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/
CV2015-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/T77P-4JU2]; Jeffrey D. Koelemay, Bill to Curb
Class Suits Clears Committee; Civil Rights Plaintiffs Thrown a Bone, 16 BNA CLASS
ACTION RPT. 718 (June 24, 2015).
337
For proposed reforms based on competition, see Burch, supra note 71, at
168–85.
338
E.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999) (prohibiting a
collateral attack); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 384–87 (2000).
339
Building from the insights in this Article, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation proposes just such a theory. Burch, supra note 71, at 135–54.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1: MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION DATASET
CASE LISTS
MDL
Number

Filed

Coordinated Closed

District

In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab.
Litig. (No. VI)

875

1/17/91

7/29/91

pending

E. D.
Penn.

In re: Factor VIII or IX
Concentrate Blood Products
Prod. Liab. Litig.

986

7/13/93

12/7/93

12/31/13 N. D. Ill.

In re: Diet Drugs
(Phentermine/Fenfluramine/
Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1203

9/23/97

12/10/97

pending

In re: Propulsid Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1355

5/24/00

8/7/00

10/21/13 E. D. La.

In re: Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether ("MTBE") Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1358

6/6/00

10/10/00

pending

S.D.N.Y

In re: Baycol Prod. Liab. Litig.

1431

8/21/01

12/18/01

pending

D. Minn.

In re: Neurontin Marketing,
Sales Practices and Prod.
Liab. Litig.

1479

4/30/02

8/15/02

12/18/14 D. Mass.

In re: Prempro Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1507

10/18/02 3/4/03

3/11/16

E.D.
Ark.

In re: Accutane (Isotrentinoin)
Prod. Liab. Litig.

1626

6/7/04

11/1/04

8/4/15

M. D. Fl.

In re: Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig.

1657

10/8/04

2/16/05

pending

E. D. La.

In re: Ford Motor Co. E-350
Van Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II)

1687

3/16/05

6/16/05

7/15/13

D.N.J.

In re: Ford Motor Co. Speed
Control Deactivation Switch
Prod. Liab. Litig.

1718

7/15/05

8/9/06

8/6/13

E. D.
Mich.

In re: Celexa and Lexapro
Prod. Liab. Litig.

1736

11/9/05

2/17/06

9/4/13

E. D.
Mo.

In re: OrthoEvra Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1742

11/28/05 3/1/06

1/7/15

N.D.
Ohio

In re: Aredia and Zometa Prod. 1760
Liab. Litig.

1/27/06

4/18/06

9/26/14

M.D.
Tenn.

In re: Human Tissue Prod.
Liab. Litig.

1763

2/7/06

6/13/07

11/5/13

D.N.J.

In re: Fosamax Prod. Liab.
Litig. (MDL 1789)

1789

5/24/06

2/15/07

pending

S.D.N.Y

In re: Mirapex Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1836

2/6/07

6/22/07

pending

D. Minn.

In re: Kugel Mesh Hernia
Patch Prod. Liab. Litig.

1842

2/28/07

6/22/07

pending

D.
Rhode
Island

In re: ConAgra Peanut Butter
Prod. Liab. Litig.

1845

3/6/07

6/17/07

4/2/15

N. D.
Ga.

In re: Avandia Marketing Sales
Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig.

1871

6/11/07

10/16/07

pending

E. D.
Penn.

Litigation Name

E. D.
Penn.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt

unknown

Seq: 89

29-SEP-17

12:56

2017] REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1533
MDL
Number

Filed

Coordinated Closed

District

In re: FEMA Trailer
Formaldehyde Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1873

6/12/07

10/24/07

5/11/15

E. D. La.

In re: Gadolinium Contrast
Dyes Prod. Liab. Litig.

1909

10/26/07 2/27/08

4/30/15

N.D.
Ohio

In re: Trasylol Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1928

1/3/08

4/7/08

8/10/15

S. D. Fl.

In re: Levaquin Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1943

2/19/08

6/13/08

pending

D. Minn.

In re: Heparin Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1953

4/4/08

6/6/08

9/23/16

N.D.
Ohio

In re: Zurn Pex Plumbing
Prod. Liab. Litig.

1958

4/21/08

8/21/08

8/1/13

D. Minn.

In re: NuvaRing Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1964

5/9/08

8/22/08

pending

E. D.
Mo.

In re: Bisphenol-A (BPA)
Polycarbonate Plastics Prod.
Liab. Litig.

1967

5/23/08

8/13/08

7/19/13

W. D.
Mo.

In re: Whirlpool Corp. FrontLoading Washer Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2001

9/26/08

12/20/08

9/29/16

N.D.
Ohio

In re: Mentor Corp. ObTape
Transobuturator Sling Prod.
Liab. Litig.

2004

10/14/08 12/3/08

pending

M. D.
Ga.

In re: Land Rover LR3 Tire
Wear Products Liability
Litigation

2008

10/29/08 2/23/09

8/7/13

C. D.
Cal.

In re: Bayer Corp.
Combination Asprin Prod.
Marketing and Sales Practices
Litig.

2023

1/6/09

4/14/09

5/14/14

E.D.N.Y.

In re: Apple iPhone 3G
Products Liability Litigation

2045

3/11/09

7/1/09

7/10/14

N. D.
Cal.

In re: Chinese-Manufactured
Drywall Prod. Liab. Litig.

2047

3/13/09

6/15/09

pending

E. D. La.

In re: Denture Cream
Products Liab. Litig.

2051

3/24/09

6/9/09

11/16/15 S. D. Fl.

In re: Chantix Prod. Liab. Litig

2092

7/8/09

10/1/09

10/6/14

N.D. Al.

In re: Yasmin and Yaz
(Drospirenone) Marketing ,
Sales Practices Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2100

7/30/09

10/1/09

pending

S. D. Ill.

In re: IKO Roofing Shingle
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2104

8/12/09

12/3/09

pending

C. D. Ill.

In re: Toyota Motor Corp.
Unintended Acceleration
Marketing, Sales Practices,
and Products Liab. Litig.

2151

2/4/10

4/9/10

pending

C. D.
Cal.

In re: Zimmer Durom Hip Cup
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2158

3/15/10

6/9/10

pending

D.N.J.

Litigation Name
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MDL
Number

Filed

Coordinated Closed

District

In re: Toyota Motor Corp.
Hybrid Brake Marketing, Sales
Practices, and Products Liab.
Litig.

2172

4/21/10

8/17/10

8/6/13

C.D Cal.

In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the
Gulf of Mexico, on April 20,
2010

2179

5/6/10

8/10/10

pending

E. D. La.

In re: C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic
Repair System Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2187

7/15/10

10/12/10

pending

S. D. W.
Va.

In re: Apple Inc. iPhone 4
Marketing, Sales Practices &
Prod. Liab. Lit.

2188

7/15/10

10/8/10

7/29/13

N. D.
Cal.

In re: DePuy Orthopaedics
Inc., ASR Hip Implant Prod.
Liab. Litig.

2197

9/3/10

12/3/10

pending

N.D.
Ohio

In re: Navistar 6.0 Diesel
Engine Prod. Liab. Litig.

2223

12/10/10 4/13/11

7/18/13

N. D. Ill.

In re: Darvocet, Darvon and
Propoxyphene Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2226

12/15/10 8/16/11

3/16/17

E.D. Ky.

In re: Porsche Cars North
America Inc. Plastic Coolant
Tubes Prod. Liab. Litig.

2233

2/16/11

5/23/11

3/19/14

S.D.
Ohio

In re: Fosamax (Alendronate
Sodium) Prod. Liab. Litig. (No.
II)

2243

3/24/11

2/3/12

pending

D.N.J.

In re: DePuy Orthopaedics,
Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2244

3/28/11

2/8/12

pending

N.D.
Texas

In re: Zimmer Nexgen Knee
Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.

2272

6/6/11

8/8/11

pending

E. D. Ill.

In re: Building Materials
Corporation of America
Asphalt Roofing Shingle Prod.
Liab. Litig.

2283

7/14/11

10/11/11

7/15/14

D. S.
Carolina

In re: Imprelis Herbicide
Marketing, Sales Practice, and
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2284

7/22/11

10/20/11

pending

E. D.
Penn.

In re: Actos (Pioglitazone)
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2299

8/31/11

12/29/11

pending

W. D.
La.

In re: Skechers Toning Shoe
Prod. Liab.Litig.

2308

9/30/11

12/19/11

pending

W. D.
Ky.

In re: Ford Motor Co. Spark
Plug and 3-Valve Engine Prod.
Liab. Litig.

2316

10/21/11 2/8/12

2/5/16

N.D.
Ohio

In re: American Medical
Systems Inc., Pelvic Repair
System, Prod. Liab. Litig.

2325

11/23/11 2/7/12

pending

S. D. W.
Va.

In re: Boston Scientific Corp
Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig.

2326

11/28/11 2/7/12

pending

S.D.W.V.

Litigation Name
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Number

Filed

In re: Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic
Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig.

2327

11/28/11 2/7/12

pending

S. D. W.
Va.

In re: Wright Medical
Technology, Inc., Conserve
Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.

2329

11/29/11 2/8/12

pending

N. D.
Ga.

In re: Propecia (Finasteride)
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2331

12/6/11

4/16/12

pending

E.D.N.Y.

In re: MI Windows & Doors,
Inc., Prod. Liab. Litig.

2333

12/8/11

4/23/12

8/4/15

D. S.
Carolina

In re: Zoloft (Sertraline
Hydrochloride) Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2342

1/18/12

4/17/12

pending

E. D.
Penn.

In re: Watson Fentanyl Patch
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2372

4/13/12

8/7/12

8/15/14

N. D. Ill.

In re: Pradaxa (Dabigatran
Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig.

2385

5/30/12

8/8/12

pending

S. D. Ill.

In re: Coloplast Corp. Pelvic
Support Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig.

2387

6/5/12

8/6/12

pending

S.D. W.
Va.

In re: Biomet M2a Magnum
Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.

2391

6/27/12

10/2/12

pending

N. D.
Ind.

In re: Nexium (Esomeprazole)
Products Liability Litigation

2404

8/27/12

12/6/12

1/4/17

C. D.
Cal.

In re: Plavix Marketing, Sales
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig.
(No. II)

2418

10/15/12 2/12/13

pending

D.N.J.

In re: New England
Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2419

10/16/12 2/12/13

pending

D. Mass.

In re: Fresenius
GranuFlo/NaturaLyte
Dialysate Prod. Liab. Litig.

2428

12/12/12 3/29/13

pending

D. Mass.

In re: Mirena IUD Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2434

1/16/13

4/8/13

8/9/16

S.D.N.Y

In re: Tylenol (Acetaminophen) 2436
Marketing, Sales Practices and
Prod. Liab. Litig.

1/17/13

4/1/13

pending

E. D.
Penn.

Litigation Name

Coordinated Closed

District
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Liaison Counsel
Appearances

Executive Committee
Appearances

Steering Committee
Appearances

Other Leadership
Appearances

Total Leadership
Appearances

Total MDL
Appearances

Attorney
Arsenault, Richard
Seeger, Christopher
Nast, Dianne
Becnel, Jr., Daniel
Parker, Jerrold
Conroy, Jayne
Parfitt, Michelle
Levin, Arnold
Robinson, Jr., Mark
London, Michael
Crump, Martin
DeBartolomeo, A.J.
Flaherty, Yvonne
Osborne, Joseph
Thompson III, Fred
Shkolnik, Hunter
Restaino, John
Cartmell, Thomas
Dugan, II, James
Zonies, Joseph
Abrams, Rachel
Blizzard, Edward
Oliver, Alyson
Lanier, W. Mark
Flowers, Peter
Matthews, David
Meadow, Richard
Anapol, Thomas
Salim, Robert
Monsour, Doug
Garrard, III, Henry
Chaffin, Eric
Love, Scott
Burnett, Jr., Riley
Mueller, Mark
Copeland, Erin
Goetz, Michael
Hauer, Stacy
Maniatis, Victoria
Miller, Michael
Robins, III, Bill
Saunders, Joseph
Cabraser, Elizabeth
Aylstock, Bryan
Climaco, John
Placitella, Christopher
Potts, Derek
Alonso, Andres
Clarke, Clayton
Grand, Jeff

Lead Counsel
Appearances

TABLE A2: TOP 50 REPEAT PLAYERS IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS
BY APPEARANCE TYPE

3
1
2
0
0
1
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
3
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
3
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
2
1
0
0

1
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0

2
3
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
3
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
0
1
1
2
1

13
12
12
11
10
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

2
2
2
0
0
1
0
3
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
2
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

21
21
19
14
11
12
11
15
14
14
8
7
7
7
12
9
10
8
7
7
6
6
6
11
8
7
7
7
7
6
11
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
10
9
6
6
7
6
6
6

18
16
14
14
11
10
10
9
10
9
8
7
7
7
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
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TABLE A3: LEAD LAWYER FIRM APPEARANCES ON THE PLAINTIFFS’
SIDE IN PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALES-PRACTICES
PROCEEDINGS
Firm Name
Neblett Beard & Arsenault
Lanier Law Firm
Seeger Weiss, LLP
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP
Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles P.C.
Motley Rice
Weitz & Luxenberg
Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP
Zimmerman Reed
Parker Waichman Alonso LLP
Matthews & Associates
Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli Co., LPA
Wagstaff & Cartmell
Robinson Calcagnie & Robinson
Hanly Conroy Bierstein Sheridan Fisher & Hayes LLP
Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A.
Anapol Schwartz
Cohen, Placitella & Roth
Restaino Law Firm
Johnson Becker
Monsour Law Firm
Law Offices of Daniel E. Becnel, Jr.
Morgan & Morgan P.A.
Blizzard, McCarthy & Nabers
Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overhotz
Foote Meyers Mielke & Flowers, P.C.
Oliver Law Group
Saunders & Walker
Parker Waichman, LLP
Reilly Pozner LLP
Mueller Law
Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik, LLP
Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis Inc.
RodaNast P.C.
Lewis & Roberts
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP
Hersh & Hersh
Law Offices of Riley Burnett, Jr.
Douglas & London
Bernstein Liebhard, LLP
Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, PLLC
Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Ashley, P.C.
Audet & Partners, LLP
Freese & Goss
Becnel Law Firm LLC
Murray Law Firm

Firm Appearances in
MDL Proceedings
18
17
16
15
14
12
11
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
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